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Abstract 
The five experiments in this dissertation examine the social effects of metaphor context 
production and comprehension. In Studies 1 and 2, participants wrote a meaningful 
discourse context for metaphorical or literal sentences. Participants providing context for 
metaphor used more idiomatic emotional expressions, cognitive mechanism words (e.g., 
“think”) and adverbs. Those responding to the literal prompts used physical descriptions. 
These results are interpreted in light of research that shows idiomatic expressions and 
cognitive mechanism words are used to express emotion and signal friendship. In Study 
2, use of affective content in the metaphor condition was positively correlated with scores 
on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Participants in the 
metaphor group also scored higher on this task compared to the literal group. The Eyes 
findings show writers in the metaphor condition framed their context to engage an 
ostensive audience. Studies 3 and 4 consisted of reading short scenarios that ended with 
metaphorical or literal statements, followed by questions assessing social and emotional 
inferences of the participants. Participants also completed the Eyes task. Use of metaphor 
by characters in a story was perceived as more emotionally intense and suggestive of 
interpersonal closeness. Scores on the Eyes task positively and uniquely correlated with 
social variables (closeness and emotional intensity) when scenarios ended with metaphor, 
but not when they ended with literal statements. These correlations show those who 
perceived metaphor as socially informative were more accurate at identifying emotions in 
others. Study 5 tested the premise that even out of context, metaphor comprehension 
proceeds through inferences of an implicit intention (e.g., Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006). 
After reading metaphorical or literal sentences, the participants completed the Eyes task 
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and a non-social, creativity task (wherein participants provided nouns in response to verb 
prompts). Participants who read metaphor did better on the Eyes task than those who read 
literal counterparts, supporting the claim that, even out of context, metaphor conveys an 
interpersonal intention. Additionally, compared to the literal group, participants in the 
metaphor group provided more “social” words in response to verb prompts. Results are 
discussed in light of embodied cognition.  
 
Key words: figurative language; metaphor; Theory of Mind; pragmatics; emotion; social 
cognition 
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Chapter One 
Traditional approaches to the study of language tend to focus on literal words or 
phrases. These literal elements correspond to the dictionary definition of a given concept 
and are thought to constitute a mental lexicon or some other symbolic store. The idea that 
we store and access dictionary definitions has long influenced research on reading and 
writing in the cognitive sciences.  The role of figurative language has been minimized in 
much of this research.  Figurative elements were generally considered distracting, 
aesthetic embellishments that were not useful in communication because of their inherent 
ambiguity (a perspective summarized by Gibbs, 1994). Consequently, the traditional 
study of meaning has been closely associated with literal language (Gibbs, 1994).  
In contrast to literal language, figurative language is a broad category of language 
that deviates in some way from dictionary definitions of words.  This type of language 
changes or enhances the meaning of a single word or phrase and, in context, is often not 
literally true. Consider for instance the Shakespearean metaphoric expression “Juliet is 
the sun”, in which a person is compared to an astronomical entity. The intention of the 
writer is not a literal one. To understand the statement, the reader must know what the 
sun is, know that Juliet is not an astronomical body, and yet connect the two. Because the 
intention is non-literal, metaphor can be considered a basic form of pretense: the act of 
saying one thing but intending something else. The ability to understand even simple acts 
of pretense like this Shakespearean metaphor requires social and inferential skill (Oately, 
1999).  
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This thesis explores the idea that metaphorical expressions implicitly convey 
emotional and interpersonal information. Despite some of the seemingly obvious 
communicative benefits of being literal and direct, we use metaphoric expressions 
frequently to express a variety of abstract concepts. To “stomp out racism”, to “carry a 
grudge”, and to “wander lonely as a cloud” are all metaphorical actions that never 
actually occur in a world constrained by physics. Metaphorical expressions thus involve 
word-play and pretense that is imaginative in nature. The act of pretending objects are 
something that they are not is fundamental to thought (Leslie, 1987). The cognitive 
ability to understand pretense, and thus the groundwork for metaphor comprehension, 
develops early in life (around age 4, according to Vosniadu, 1987). Metaphor’s 
subsequent use in discourse is ubiquitous, suggesting this type of pretense is widely 
useful.  In fact, some researchers suggest we use pretense in communication for a variety 
of purposes including to reach some satisfactory comprehension of events in the world or 
to express social or emotional experience (Gallese, 2007; Oately, 1999).   
Philosophers have suggested that metaphoric expression is an important part of 
communication because it conveys social and interpersonal perspectives and opinions. 
On metaphorical comparisons such as that of man to wolf, Turbayne (1962, p. 15) muses 
“I do not merely pretend that man shares the properties of wolves; I intend it. I intend that 
he shares some properties of wolves but not enough of them to be classified as an actual 
wolf”. In Turbayne’s (1962) example, acts of pretense serve some communicative 
purpose such as expressing intention. Cohen (1978) characterizes the process of 
understanding intention as highly social, indicating, “I want to suggest a point in 
metaphor which is independent of the question of cognitivity and which has nothing to do 
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with its aesthetic character. I think of this point as the achievement of intimacy. There is a 
unique way in which the maker and the appreciator of a metaphor are drawn closer to one 
another.” He adds, “literal discourse is so pervasive and routine [it goes] unremarked” (p. 
8). Taken together, these philosophers’ comments are suggestive of metaphor’s role in 
communicating an intention and providing insight into beliefs held by others. These 
conceptions of metaphor suggest non-literal interpretation requires general social skills 
like Theory of Mind (ToM; i.e., the ability to identify emotional states and beliefs held by 
others and one’s own states and beliefs; e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
Extending philosophical observations, psychological researchers have since 
provided their own insights into why we use metaphorical expression, claiming that it 
(and other forms of non-literal language) “conveys special pragmatic effects that no other 
kind of speech can easily communicate” (Gibbs & Colston, 2012, p.10). To date, there is 
a small but growing literature that shows the importance of pragmatic social knowledge 
in the comprehension of different types of non-literal language. For instance, sarcasm is 
used in conversation to either signal friendship (Pexman & Zvaigzne, 2004) or ridicule 
victims (Bowes & Katz, 2011). Knowledge of a person’s occupation invites one to 
comprehend a given statement as either metaphor or irony, even at early processing 
stages in comprehension (Katz & Pexman, 2007; Pexman, Ferretti & Katz, 2000; Katz, 
Blasko & Kazmerski, 2004). Indeed, Ortony (1975) suggests metaphor is used to 
effectively express abstract ideas and make topics of discussion more vivid. As a result, 
metaphor’s effects may be socially motivated and designed to inspire reactions in others. 
Although these findings are interesting, few researchers have experimentally investigated 
social effects of metaphor production and comprehension. The studies presented in this 
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dissertation represent a significant step towards situating metaphor production and 
comprehension in a fundamentally interpersonal framework.  
In considering metaphor’s interpersonal effects, I take a different approach from 
much of the extant research. A popular approach to metaphor research is Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory (CMT) wherein researchers connect patterns of metaphor use to 
ostensive underlying conceptual structures in the mind (see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). For instance the metaphorical expressions “we’ve reached a crossroads”, “we’re 
on a crash course” and “our relationship has hit a few roadblocks” reflect the underlying 
conceptual mapping of love to the concrete experience of a journey (LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY). Under this perspective, thought is fundamentally metaphoric and all 
instances of communication reflect the use of basic conceptual structures. Although CMT 
is a compelling line of inquiry, the research presented in this dissertation takes a different 
view of metaphorical communication. In conceptualizing all language as fundamentally 
metaphorical, CMT misses the variability of metaphor use in everyday language. For 
instance, other research in the field shows that there is variability in when we chose to 
use indirect language such as irony, sarcasm or metaphor compared to when we opt for a 
more direct approach (see e.g., Horton, 2007, Gibbs, 2004). This variability tends to 
correspond with intimacy and closeness between speakers. Therefore, my research 
reflects an analysis of the downstream pragmatic effects of using metaphor and not 
necessarily its connection to conceptual metaphor structures. The general approach I 
employ characterizes metaphors as linguistic expressions used to reach certain 
communicative goals. Indeed when I use the term “metaphor” throughout this 
5 
 
 
 
dissertation, I am referring to the metaphoric expression and not the hypothesized 
underlying conceptual metaphor. 
This thesis explores the role of social effects that follow from comprehending 
metaphoric expressions. A social action is something that has meaning for both the 
person producing the action and the person perceiving and interpreting that action. In the 
course of a day, we perform many social actions that are intended for others to interpret. 
These include smiling and saying “hi”, sending emails or telling a friend about weekend 
plans. In performing any number of social actions, we let people know how we are 
feeling and what we are thinking. In turn, these people are, to different degrees, affected 
by our actions. I hypothesize that metaphor has social communicative effects on others 
that are not readily produced by literal language. As Gibbs (1994) indicates, metaphor’s 
expressive function is two-fold: it allows the speaker to express an attitude (or, more 
specifically, intention) and prompts the listener to interpret and perceive that attitude (or 
intention). As a result, I believe both interlocutors are drawn closer together. I posit that 
the use of metaphor results in social effects such as greater interpersonal closeness 
between the speakers and greater perceived emotional intensity. This dissertation will 
show that these effects are more powerful than saying something literally. 
To explore metaphor’s social function, I intend to show that this type of language 
has powerful interpersonal effects in both production and reading comprehension studies. 
The following review provides a basis for the idea that metaphor permits the expression 
of thoughts and feelings to others and thus serves to create a sense of interpersonal 
closeness and convey emotional intensity. I will draw on studies that show metaphor is 
used with friends and in-groups, as indirect support of the social effects of metaphor. 
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Additionally, I will connect metaphor to embodied cognition and ToM, in order to 
provide the basic mechanisms by which metaphor shows social effects. I will conclude 
with an outline of the five studies in this dissertation. 
The Role of Context and Intention 
Non-literal language includes acts found in speech and writing such as sarcasm, 
irony, metaphor, metonymy and hyperbole. Early theories of language comprehension 
proposed that literal meaning is always accessed first and non-literal interpretation of an 
utterance follows under special circumstances, signaled by cues in conversation (e.g., 
Grice, 1985). Metaphorical expressions were initially characterized as disruptive to 
interpersonal communication because these phrases are literally false and, therefore, take 
longer to comprehend (detailed by Grice, 1985). Some assumptions of this traditional 
perspective are not supported by empirical evidence. For instance, metaphor can be read 
as quickly as literal sentences when supported by sufficiently elaborate discourse context 
(Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984) and is not perceived as disruptive to conversation 
(Hussey, 2008, Study 3). Nonetheless, the importance of understanding a speaker’s 
intention or perceiving some extra-linguistic cues is still considered an important part of 
metaphor comprehension (e.g., Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006).  
From early on, researchers have suggested that metaphor has special 
communicative qualities. For instance, unlike literal language, metaphor is thought to 
produce a cognitive tension when two dissimilar concepts are compared (Richards, 
1936). The interpretation of metaphorical meaning releases this tension, resulting in 
satisfaction in reaching an appropriate interpretation. Some researchers suggest the 
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cognitive work required in comprehending metaphor results in a new meaning or 
experience that is useful for the person expending this effort (Berggren, 1962). For 
instance, aesthetic qualities are thought to emerge from the cognitive activity of 
connecting “Juliet” to “the sun” (Black, 1977). Others suggest that understanding the 
social and emotional intention of the speaker is an inseparable part of metaphor 
interpretation (Sopory, 2005; Cohen, 1978). As a whole, these lenses of inquiry suggest 
that metaphor comprehension involves cognitive work beyond the sole application of 
lexical or “semantic” knowledge. Moreover, the implication is that metaphor is used in 
communication to achieve some interpersonal effect that is more cognitively or 
emotionally powerful than when communicating literally (e.g., Cohen, 1978; Ortony, 
1975).  
Support for the social effects of metaphor can be found in theories that 
incorporate social and discourse contexts into models of comprehension. Underscoring 
much of the research on metaphor is the role of contextual knowledge such as 
interpersonal and pragmatic information and how this knowledge aids in interpretation 
(Katz, 2005). “Context” can refer to a number of constraints, including knowledge of the 
preceding utterances, social setting, cultural assumptions, beliefs about the speaker’s 
intention and even emotional content. Essentially, context captures many elements 
outside of a strictly defined lexicon or semantic memory. Context models show that 
metaphor is used and comprehended socially. Therefore, the desire to produce effects or 
deduce the intention associated with a metaphorical comment is explained, in part, by 
contextual factors like the relevance of the comment and common ground between 
speakers. Metaphor comprehension likely uses semantic knowledge but is also 
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constrained by social, pragmatic and contextual knowledge. As Katz (2005, p. 185) 
indicates, “even when presumably out of context, the interpretation of a given statement 
is inextricably linked to the manner in which it is presented, and when an explicit context 
is not available, one is constructed during the act of comprehension”. Context models 
therefore emphasize the idea that metaphor is a highly social act and is understood largely 
through social and extra-linguistic information.   
Context models suggest that basic social processes for effective communication 
require the interlocutors to grasp what is relevant and what they should attend to. 
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) places metaphor comprehension in the 
context of interaction and inferential processing. Comprehension follows from the 
pragmatic knowledge of the speaker and listener, often through interpretation of the 
intended meaning. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), metaphor is an act that 
draws attention to itself (e.g., ostensive) and the costs and benefits of comprehending this 
extra information are weighed by the interlocutor. Interpretation of ostensive acts requires 
both knowledge of the current interpersonal context as well as a search for meaning that 
is congruent with this context. For instance, consider an exchange between friends, where 
one friend says to another, “you’re an angel”. For comprehension to proceed, the target of 
the statement “seeks a mutually salient cognitive environment in which that phrase[…] is 
relevant” (Ritchie, 2006, p.83, emphasis added). The tenets of Relevance Theory are 
significant to the social hypothesis that I am extending. That is, I argue that metaphor 
demands social attention as an ostensive act. Additionally, metaphorical meaning is 
situated and is partially (if not fully) computed by considering another’s perspective and 
intention. 
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In addition to relevance, other context based research expands on the mutual 
understanding required in metaphor comprehension and interpretation. The creation of a 
mutual understanding of what is being discussed is captured by “common ground” or the 
shared knowledge on which the interaction rests (Clark, 1996).  Common ground can be 
assumed (e.g., when conversing with friends) or “created” through linguistic choices that 
emphasize shared understanding and social closeness. Although all acts of 
communication require some shared common ground, metaphor is thought to be 
particularly constrained by this experience because, as discussed above, comprehension is 
strongly inferential (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989). The act of interpreting metaphors such as 
‘you’re an angel’ results in small ‘aha’ moments between two people (Jung-Beeman et 
al., 2004) and subsequently creates or reinforces common ground (Horton, 2007). Once 
again, metaphor comprehension relies on a shared sense of meaning that incorporates 
interpersonal and pragmatic information. The social result of contextually constrained 
and highly inferential meaning is the creation of a unique type of interpersonal closeness 
(Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989).  
Social information is so important to metaphor comprehension that Ritchie (2006) 
claims metaphor has its origins in social interactions such as conversation. Consequently, 
he states non-literal interpretation is strongly tied to an explicit or implicit (e.g., inferred) 
context. According to his Context-limited simulation theory, what an interlocutor 
interprets in conversation relies heavily on the conversational context or the frame of the 
talk. Memories, emotion, cultural constraints and inferences about the mental state of the 
interlocutor are factors that can be incorporated in conversation even in the absence of 
overt contextual information, where these extralinguistic cues must be inferred. Working 
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memory holds relevant emotional and linguistic information. Inferences are made in real 
time as information is exchanged in conversation. Although all language at some level 
requires inferential processing, Ritchie’s (2006) theory suggests that metaphor strongly 
relies on introspective and emotional simulation. As a consequence, metaphor is both 
cognitive and social, and exerts interpersonal effects beyond speaking literally. 
Although largely untested, Ritchie’s (2006) model unites ideas from many context 
models of comprehension. For instance, common ground and the interpretation of 
ostensive acts are basic to his theory. Likewise, his model is congruent with constraint 
based approaches that indicate non-literal interpretation relies on many different 
contextual constraints (e.g., who is speaking, where and why). Ritchie (2006) proposes 
that, based on context, metaphor comprehension proceeds through embodied 
interpretations of the material (discussed in more detail in the next sections) and 
introspective qualities like emotional experience and intention of the speaker. These 
introspective qualities suggest metaphor might result in social effects (explored in the 
next section). Therefore based on the tenets of Context-limited simulation and other 
context models (e.g, Katz, 2005), the work in this dissertation tests the idea that social 
and emotional information is activated in metaphor comprehension. 
In sum, context theories suggest the interpretation of metaphorical utterances 
require some representation of the speaker’s attitudes and beliefs as well as the creation 
of common ground on which the interaction rests. According to Cohen (1978, p. 9), the 
process of comprehension “initiates the cooperative act of comprehension which is, in 
any view, something more than a routine act of understanding”. Consequently, 
metaphoric language does not only highlight these social bonds, but does it more strongly 
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than literal language (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989). The implication from context models is that 
metaphor should show interpersonal effects such as greater perceived closeness or more 
emotional intensity compared to literal counterparts. The next two sections explore the 
limited empirical evidence for the social consequences of metaphor use, and the role of 
embodied cognition in comprehension. 
Social consequences 
Context models provide support for the social effects of metaphor because they 
incorporate social acts such as understanding another’s perspective, re-affirming common 
experience, building emotional connections and, broadly, maintaining relationships. 
Consequently, metaphor conveys subtle social information. In a related stream of 
research, Ortony (1975, p. 45) posited that “metaphor is an essential ingredient in 
communication”. Under this rubric, he proposed that metaphor has three significant 
effects that are largely social and expressive in nature. The compactness hypothesis 
suggests metaphor compacts information, allowing the speaker to say more using fewer 
words. Accordingly, the listener can unpack the comment given his or her own 
motivation and effort to understand it. Literal language does not compact information 
because it has a more narrow inferential scope (Gibbs, 1994). The vividness hypothesis 
suggests another effect of metaphor is to enhance the topic of conversation and make 
certain aspects more emotionally or cognitively vivid. Finally, the expressibility 
hypothesis states that metaphor enabless speakers to effectively express abstract topics of 
conversation such as thoughts and feelings or intangible concepts such as “justice” or 
“time”. Based on these three hypotheses, Ortony (1975) posits that metaphor has great 
communicative potential because it widens the scope of what interlocutors can discuss. 
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This thesis explores the communicative aspects of metaphor that result in social and 
interpersonal effects. The working hypothesis of the work presented here is that the 
proposed effects such as Ortony’s  (1975) three hypotheses draw the interlocutors 
together in shared experience of meaning. 
Indirect support of the claim that metaphor inspires interpersonal closeness in a 
more significant way than literal language comes from the fact that groups of friends 
show considerable metaphor use in discourse (Gibbs, 2000). Fussell and Krauss (1989) 
demonstrated that, when asked to describe abstract drawings, speakers tend to use more 
metaphor when they are talking to people they know than with strangers. Moreover, 
researchers suggest that the use of metaphor enables interlocutors to uniquely express 
emotional experience in order to emphasize closeness and to build friendships (Gibbs, 
Leggitt & Turner, 2002).Therefore, the willingness to use metaphor with friends suggests 
common ground is already established and metaphor further reminds the interlocutors of 
their closeness.  
Additional indirect support of the social effects of metaphor comes from research 
that shows non-literal language plays subtle roles in demarcating broad social ingroups 
and outgroups. Gibbs and Nagaoka (1985) showed non-literal slang (e.g., he’s on a trip) 
in conversation was more memorable than literal equivalents because it connoted a 
certain attitude on the part of the speaker that was ostensibly shared with other ingroup 
members. The authors suggest slang metaphor is memorable because it conveys 
interpersonal information. Similarly, other research shows that neighbors use metaphors 
such as “keep an eye out” to build a sense of community and group safety (Ritchie, 
2011). These patterns of communication help identify group members, strengthen bonds 
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and guard against uncertainty (Ritchie, 2011). Whether within groups of friends or larger 
communities, metaphor is, arguably, used to establish, to enhance or to re-experience 
interpersonal closeness. 
Metaphor is also used in ambiguous social situations and can result in 
interpersonal and social effects (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Horton, 2007). In one study (Horton, 
2007), participants read short scenarios describing interactions between two people 
whose relationship was ambiguous. Some of these encounters ended with a literal 
statement and some with a metaphorical statement. Interlocutors who used metaphors 
were rated as “closer” or better friends than those using literal language. Additionally, 
Gibbs, Kushner and Mills (1991) show that mere knowledge of intentional agents aids in 
comprehension and interpretation of metaphor. In one of their studies, participants in two 
groups read the same metaphors. One group was told the metaphors (e.g., “A family 
album is a museum”) were written by poets and the other was told the metaphors were 
generated by a computer program. Participants who believed they were reading poets’ 
metaphors rated these as more meaningful and produced more interpretations than when 
they thought metaphors were generated by a computer program.  Taken together, these 
findings are broadly supportive of Ritchie’s (2006) claim that, even given a metaphor in 
isolation or ambiguous situations, we imagine the content is produced by an intentional 
agent or we infer other socially informative elements (e.g., interpersonal closeness).  
In sum, metaphor exerts subtle, but powerful interpersonal effects. Why might 
metaphorical language result in these types of effects? Based on the review presented 
here, the answer to this question o lies in a number of different research streams. First, 
metaphor requires some cognitive work on the part of the interlocutors that includes the 
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application of contextual and extralinguistic knowledge (Katz, 2005). Interpretation of 
these ostensive acts may result in the comprehension of an abstract cognitive concept or a 
vivid experience of what was said (Ortony, 1975). Extending Ortony’s (1975) ideas, the 
use of metaphorical expressions helps strengthen bonds or remind the interlocutors of 
their relationship to one another (Gibbs, Leggitt & Turner, 2002). Moreover, intention is 
inferred in the absence of unambiguous interpersonal information, as in Gibbs, Kushner 
and Mills (1991) computer/poet research. Indeed, Katz (2005) claims that, even in the 
absence of clear contextual cues, these cues are inferred. Cues can include introspective 
qualities like emotion and intention (Ritchie, 2006; Sopory, 2005). Taken together, these 
studies suggest metaphor requires a unique ability to identify thoughts and feelings in 
others. I posit that the result of the interpretation of others’ thoughts and emotions are 
social effects like emotional closeness. These effects might be best explained by the role 
of embodied experience of meaning and Theory of Mind. The next sections explore these 
topics. 
Embodied mechanisms in the experience of metaphor 
Given the eclectic bits of evidence for the social effects of metaphor, it is no 
surprise that the literature offers no principled account of the mechanisms by which 
metaphor displays these effects. The social effects of metaphor described in the previous 
sections could result solely from propositional information or feature lists in semantic 
memory. However, the importance of context, common ground and intention suggest this 
perspective is inadequate. A propositional account does not capture the richness of 
metaphor, the associated imagery, sensations, attitudes and emotional impact. Instead, 
metaphor comprehension likely involves a vivid experience of the subject matter that 
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uses “perceptual, proprioceptive and introspective simulations” (Ritchie, 2006, p.172). In 
fact, Ortony’s (1975) proposed effects of metaphor, including vividness and 
expressibility, might best be considered embodied experiences of language (Cicciarci, 
Massironi, & Corradini, 2004; Muran & DiGuiseppe, 1990). Therefore, in my opinion, 
the strongest explanation for social effects may be captured by an embodied view of 
cognition
1
. 
The embodied cognition perspective has recently been applied to metaphor 
comprehension and provides a logical and powerful explanation of metaphor’s cognitive 
and emotional effects (for summary of embodied cognition see: Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 
2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ritchie, 2006). According to embodied cognition, the 
stimuli we encounter and subsequently re-encounter are stored and represented in a 
diffuse network in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). The embodied network connects physical, 
perceptual, emotional and language areas, which are activated every time new stimuli are 
processed (Niedenthal, Winkeilman, Mondillon & Vermeulin, 2009).  This perspective 
contrasts the approach that suggests the brain primarily uses abstract symbols or 
propositions (e.g., a mental lexicon) that are removed from the perceptual, emotional and 
episodic areas that initially encoded the stimuli. According to embodied cognition, the 
brain coordinates multimodal information not captured by amodal accounts in order to 
                                                          
1 Embodied cognition (or grounded cognition) is gaining research interest in the cognitive sciences. 
Although it is a strong account for a vast array of psychological findings, Barsalou (1998) does admit some 
weaknesses (e.g., the mechanisms by which the simulations run are underspecified). Nonetheless, he feels 
embodied cognition accounts for perspective taking and the interpretation of abstract and metaphorical 
stimuli. For instance, he provides an account of why false belief tasks might be embodied (p. 645-646). 
That said, I take an embodied approach throughout this dissertation, but admit this account is by no means 
complete. More work should be done on the role of embodied cognition and metaphor and the embodied 
mechanisms that underlie both metaphor and ToM (if indeed it is embodied).  I speculate on the 
mechanisms in chapter 5 to prompt further research. 
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compute meaning out of raw data and to ground experience in embodied simulation 
(Barsalou, 2008). Comprehension via simulation involves reliving or reimagining 
pertinent information associated with the stimulus. An example of embodied effects is, 
for instance, the activation of the same areas of the brain when experiencing pain as when 
watching a loved one experience that same discomfort (summarize in Lieberman, 2007). 
Embodied effects are also reflected in patterns of language use that connect physical and 
abstract experiences, such as characterizing life as a physical journey or the heart as the 
centre of emotion (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
One could argue that, if knowledge is constrained by physical experience, it 
would be improbable to simulate or embody something that is not literally true (e.g., life 
is not actually a journey) because non-literal language is not directly, physically 
experienced. In contrast, Wilson and Gibbs (2007) state that the imaginative nature of 
non-literal language is the reason we must simulate metaphor in diffuse brain regions 
(although they do not provide a complete account of the information we use to do so). 
They argue that we apply what we know about the physical world to engage metaphorical 
comprehension using cognitive work of a different kind than literal language. Therefore, 
in order to understand the metaphorical phrases “grasp the concept” or “stomp out 
racism”, we simulate actual movement of grasping or stomping. Indeed, when 
participants are primed with grasping certain objects, they respond faster to metaphors 
using the word “grasp” (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007; see also Boulenger, Hauk & 
Pulvermuller, 2009).  
There is evidence to suggest that interpretation of metaphor is also embodied at 
the level of interpersonal expression. Some researchers characterize the perception of 
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communicative intention as a strongly embodied experience (e.g., Gallese, 2007). 
Embodied simulation has powerful implications for the expression of intention associated 
with metaphorical language. Wilson and Gibbs (2007) and Gibbs and Colston (2012) 
suggest metaphor comprehension involves an imaginal “as if” (p. 217) or “what it must 
be like” (p.218) simulation process to compute meaning and interpret an interlocutor’s 
thoughts and intentions. This simulation involves imagining “being part of the action 
depicted in the linguistic expression”, as though the interlocutor is “immersed in the 
discourse situation” (p. 217-218). Therefore, I posit this “as if” simulation is not simply 
the comprehension of metaphor out-of-context or without extralinguistic knowledge. It is 
the act of taking another’s perspective to understand the intention of the comment. 
Although not explicitly stated in their work, the imaginal processing seems to be linked 
to empathy, ToM ability and other useful social information. In an interpersonal 
exchange, important social information is likely simulated in addition to requisite 
sentence level and featural information. For instance, similar areas in the brain are active 
when we both produce an emotional facial expression and perceive one (Gallese, 2008). 
One could speculate that, to some extent, metaphor comprehension recruits brain areas 
that are also used in other social or empathic processes like identifying emotional states. 
Therefore, metaphor comprehension simulates relevant information at both the cognitive 
and interpersonal level. 
In contrast to the interpretation of metaphor, Gibbs and Colston (2012) suggest 
direct communication, such as literal language, “is often vague and weak” (p. 216). 
Literal statements do little to change the cognitive experience of the comprehender (see 
also Wharton, 2008) and may not strongly require an “as if” simulation. Metaphor is 
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especially powerful in discourse, these authors propose, because it does a great deal to 
change cognitive experience or to make manifest any number of possible interpretations 
that require cognitive work on the part of the interlocutors. Similarly, these authors 
suggest that metaphor can capture attention in a way that other types of language do not. 
Both Ritchie (2006) and Gibbs and Colston (2012) propose that the requisite cognitive 
work is done (at least in part) through an embodied simulation of meaning that is bound 
by the context in which it is used. Gibbs and Colston (2012) posit that, depending on his 
or her motivation, the listener interprets the intentions of the speaker via an “as if” 
simulation that draws the interlocutors together. This simulation allows the interlocutors 
to project themselves into other “minds and worlds” (Gibbs & Colston, p. 218); 
something that direct, literal speech does not necessarily invite to the same degree.  I 
posit that the result of the “as if” simulation is a greater perceived interpersonal closeness 
between the interlocutors and a more intense sharing of emotional experience.  
 It is possible that humans have a general purpose system that could be involved in 
both embodied cognition and Gibbs and Colston’s (2012) “as if” simulation. Theory of 
Mind, a requisite of empathy, is the ability to recognize or infer mental states in others 
(Call & Tomasello, 1999). Mental states can include emotions, beliefs, desires and 
intentions (e.g, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Researchers in this area tend to distinguish 
between first order and second order abilities. First order ToM involves the attribution of 
a mental state (e.g, she’s happy) and second order ToM involves inferences about why 
someone is feeling a certain way (she’s happy because she got a tenure track position) 
(see e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
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Theory of Mind is a powerful social tool for humans and recent research suggests 
the processes that engage ToM might be strongly embodied (based on foundational work 
on the mirror neuron system in humans and non-human primates by di Pellegrino et al., 
1992; Lieberman, 2007 but for an alternate, non-embodied account see Leslie, Friedman 
& German, 2004). Moreover, ToM is required in the interpretation of interpersonal 
expression: “embodied simulation and the mirror system underpinning it provide the 
means to share communicative intentions, meaning and references, thus granting parity 
requirements for social communication” (Gallese, 2007, p. 659). Theory of Mind thus 
allows us to empathize with others, to predict behavior and to conform to social norms. 
Moreover, it is required for communicative processes like interpretation of emotional 
facial expressions and language (Gallese, 2007).  
Emergence of ToM ability in young children tends to correlate with language 
development and is often demonstrated when children use mental state words (e.g., use of 
abstract, cognitive words such as “see”, “think”, “feel”; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
Notably, an inability to make social inferences due to diminished ToM ability is a cue to 
psychological and developmental problems such as psychopathy, autism and selective 
language impairment (Miller, 2004). These clinical populations also have difficulty 
interpreting non-literal language such as metaphor and irony (Happe, 1993). Indeed, 
Happe (1993) suggests metaphor cannot be properly understood or used without ToM 
because the speaker’s mental state is crucial for comprehension. Literal interpretation will 
not provide adequate information. In fact, one way we become experts at identifying 
intentions, beliefs and desires in others is through a “learning process [that] greatly 
benefits from the repetitive exposure to the narration of stories about actions of various 
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characters” (Gallese, 2007, p. 667). Once again, pretense is the method by which we 
learn to make social inferences. The connection between ToM and metaphor is, thus, a 
logical extension of Gallese’s (2007) premise. Acts of pretense, such as through 
metaphor, may aid in the development of social skills and subsequently require ToM 
ability for comprehension. 
Given the potential role of ToM in metaphor comprehension, what might be 
simulated in an “as if” simulation? Gibbs and Colston (2012, p. 217) indicate metaphor 
carries an ostensive message that demands attention in a way that literal language does 
not and comprehension “may generally function along the lines suggested by Relevance 
Theory, but with the addition of an embodied simulation process”. Additionally, Gibbs 
(1994) suggests that the social function of metaphor is twofold: metaphor allows the 
speaker to express his or her attitude (or, presumably, intention) and allows the target of 
the statement to understand this attitude (or intention). This parity maps onto ToM 
ability. For instance, the same brain areas are activated when one performs an action and 
when one watches another perform that same action (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese, 
2008). Extending this parity to metaphor interpretation, Ritchie (2006) suggests that 
embodied “introspective qualities” like intention and emotional content are activated 
when one produces or interprets metaphorical comments. Therefore, the studies in this 
dissertation explore the role of intention in metaphorical comments and the resultant 
social effects like perceived interpersonal closeness and emotional intensity associated 
with metaphor use. The working hypothesis is that these introspective qualities are a part 
of the “as if” simulation and are experienced by both the person who produces the 
metaphorical expression and the person who deduces the meaning of this expression. 
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Testing metaphor’s effects 
 The general method of testing the social effects of metaphor in this dissertation is 
taken from the embodied cognition literature. The basic premise of embodied cognition is 
that whatever relevant information is simulated in one task can show effects on other 
tasks. Moreover, there does not have to be an obvious connection between the two tasks, 
and indeed, there is no attempt to overtly connect the tasks. For instance, consider again 
Wilson and Gibb’s (2007) work. Participants in that study were first required to make 
bodily movements like grasping and pulling. The movements, in effect, primed the 
participants to read metaphorical references (e.g., “grasp the concept”) faster than a group 
that did not perform congruent movements. Extending this embodied premise, the 
research presented in this dissertation often has participants read metaphor and then 
complete other social tasks. Participants are not told these tasks are related. The act of 
reading metaphor, which prompts emotional reliving and introspective inferences, is 
thought to “spill over” to these other tasks. The methodology used in the specific studies 
in this dissertation is detailed in the next section. 
To test the embodied “as if” simulation of others’ thoughts and feelings, I include 
a measure of social intelligence in a number of studies in this dissertation. The hypothesis 
here is that the reader or writer of metaphorical sentences simulates introspective 
qualities that include emotional content as well as another’s perspective or intention 
(Ritchie, 2006; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). The simulation of thoughts and feelings is 
predicted to impact other social and non-social tasks. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
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task (also called the Eyes task)
2
 is used in this dissertation as a proxy to assess the “as if” 
simulation of introspective qualities. The task assesses first order ToM by having 
participants choose the correct emotion from four options for sets of eyes. Scores on this 
task have been shown to be independent of IQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and general 
intelligence (Richell et al., 2003), independent of executive functioning (Gregory et al., 
2002) and performance on stroop interference tasks (Mimura, Oeda, & Kawamura, 
2006).  However, as predicted, Eyes scores correlate negatively with scores on the 
Autism Quotient (AQ) scale (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Performance on the Eyes task is 
thought to involve activation of the amygdala (Stone et al., 2003); an area of the brain 
responsible for emotional processing and social knowledge (Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 
1994). 
The Eyes task was therefore chosen for the studies in this dissertation because it 
uniquely assesses “social intelligence in otherwise normally intelligent adults” ( Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001, p 247). The eyes signal thoughts and feelings and are subtle, but 
informative, indicators of social and emotional content. Relatedly, researchers propose 
the reason we use metaphor is to both express abstract thought and inspire emotional 
reactions in others (Ortony, 1975). Connected to these reactions is the idea that we must 
use ToM processes to understand metaphor and to perceive another’s intention (Happe, 
1993). If we do project ourselves into the minds of others (Gibbs & Colston, 2012) when 
processing or using metaphor, and do so more strongly than with literal language, I 
anticipate higher scores on the Eyes task after reading metaphor and that ratings of 
                                                          
2
 Permission to use the Eyes task was granted from the Autism Research Centre at Cambridge 
(www.autismresearchcentre.com). 
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metaphorical contexts will correlate with the Eyes task (predictions for each study 
described in detail below). 
Operational goals and an overview of the Experiments 
The operational goal of this dissertation is to address the gap in the literature that 
has overlooked the social effects of metaphor production and comprehension. Based on 
the evidence reviewed, metaphor is framed with another’s perspective in mind and 
requires some understanding and representation of a speaker’s intention. Therefore both 
the creator of the metaphor and the perceiver of the metaphor activate ToM processes. 
The representation of intention, be it by the speaker or by the target, can result in any 
number of effects including emphasizing subject matter or drawing emotional reactions 
from interlocutors (Ortony, 1975). Therefore, metaphor comprehension and use can draw 
attention to the subject matter being discussed and result in, as this dissertation will show, 
interpersonal and emotional effects.  
The research in this dissertation is organized as follows. In the first set of studies, 
I intend to show that the contexts for metaphorical expression differ from the contexts of 
literal expression. Study 1 and 2 are production studies wherein participants are 
instructed to write a meaningful discourse context for metaphorical or literal sentences. 
These studies test Ortony’s (1975) hypotheses that posit metaphor is used because it 
permits the vivid expression of abstract thought to others. I predict participants providing 
context for metaphorical prompts will use markers of speech that add social and 
emotional emphasis (e.g., cognitive and emotion words and adverbs). In contrast, those 
responding to the literal prompts should use simple, physical descriptions of action 
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(congruent with findings from Cameron’s 2008 corpus research). These studies are 
intended to show metaphorical contexts are emotionally intense and enable the writer to 
express abstract thought. Study 2 connects metaphor context production to social ability 
(as assessed by the Eyes task). If metaphor prompts a deployment of attention to social 
contexts, I predict the amount of affective and cognitive content used to create contexts 
for metaphors will be positively correlated with scores on the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001). Such results would be supportive of the idea that metaphor permits the 
expression of thoughts and feelings to others, and that the contexts associated with 
metaphor activate an “as if” simulation of the kind Gibbs and Colston (2012) propose.  
Studies 3 and 4 use reading tasks wherein the information conveyed by contextual 
content is reduced to exert tighter experimental control. The intention here is to assess the 
reader’s social and emotional inferences that are prompted by metaphor and how these 
inferences relate to ToM ability.  Following methodology typically used in non-literal 
language research, participants in Studies 3 and 4 will read short scenarios that end with 
metaphorical or literal statements and will subsequently answer questions assessing social 
and emotional experiences (on likert type scales). A novel contribution to reading studies 
in general, is the inclusion of an individual differences measure of social ability; the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. Use of metaphor by characters in a story is predicted 
to be perceived by the participants as indicating greater emotional intensity and 
interpersonal closeness. Additionally, scores on the Eyes task are predicted to positively 
correlate with relevant social variables (closeness and emotional intensity) in the 
metaphor but not the literal condition. Such a correlation would support the idea that 
those who perceive social and emotional information conveyed by metaphor also tend to 
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be more accurate at identifying others’ thoughts and emotions. Once again, the results 
will be taken as supportive of the social effects of metaphor comprehension and thus 
complement the production findings of the first two studies. 
The study in the final chapter tests Gibbs and Colston’s (2012) “as if” simulation 
of metaphor more directly. Some researchers (e.g., Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006) have 
indicated that, even out of context, metaphor comprehension proceeds through the 
assumption or creation of relevant contextual and pragmatic information. “Context” is a 
broad term that, for the operational purposes of this dissertation, includes introspective 
qualities like emotion and human intent (see e.g., Ritchie, 2006). In the final study, 
metaphor is presented without context and is read word-by-word on a computer screen. 
The motivation to present metaphor without context is to further assess the strength and 
versatility of the social effects. The participants will again complete the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes task and a non-social, creativity task (noun-generation task, in which 
participants provide nouns in response to verb prompts). If relevant contextual 
information is simulated when reading metaphor, then metaphor should prompt social 
effects as measured by these other tasks. For instance, participants in the metaphor group 
should do better on the Eyes task than the literal group because of the requisite inferential 
interpretation. Additionally, compared to the literal group, participants in the metaphor 
group are expected to provide more “social” words in response to verb prompts. The 
results would be suggestive of an “as if” (Gibbs & Colston, 2012) simulation despite the 
constrained content that the participants are given. 
Taken together, the experiments in this dissertation aim to demonstrate social 
effects of metaphor comprehension and production. Moreover, the work here represents 
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one of the few attempts to directly connect metaphor comprehension with social 
processing that relies on ToM ability. These experiments are intended to provide an 
answer to why we might use metaphor and why it is a “special” method of 
communication that conveys an interpersonal sentiment. 
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Chapter Two 
Study 1 
In the two studies presented in this chapter, I test the idea that 1) the contexts in 
which metaphor is used are highly social and emotional and 2) that, due to social and 
emotional content, the creation of metaphor contexts impacts other social tasks. These 
social effects are measured with the inclusion of two individual differences measures in 
the second study (the Eyes task and the emotional self-disclosure scale). Context 
production in this chapter assesses, albeit indirectly, Gibb’s (1994) broad claim that 
metaphor permits the expression of a writer (or speaker’s) attitude or intention. 
To understand the motivation to use metaphor, first consider the reason we use 
language to communicate. The way we express ourselves conveys much about our 
thoughts, feelings and understanding of the world. Moreover, our manner of speech 
informs our relationships with others (Pennebaker, 2012). Language is thus a good proxy 
to convey our psychological states and, consequently, acts as a powerful social tool 
(Chung & Pennebaker, 2007). For instance, there are markers of speech that differ when 
we talk to a boss, a stranger, or a friend. Compared to strangers, with friends we tend to 
use more sarcasm and irony (Roberts & Kreuz, 1994), novel metaphor (Hussey & Katz, 
2009), idioms (Bell & Healy, 1992) and other potentially confusing non-literal tropes. 
Linguistic choices therefore inform and direct many social interactions.  
The early tradition in psycholinguistic research was to examine elements of 
language without any contextual information in order to determine the fundamental 
processes involved in the comprehension of a word or phrase. In fact, from this 
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perspective, context was viewed as a nuisance variable. Metaphor and other types of non-
literal language challenge this perspective. Although, in truth, most language is rarely 
encountered in a pure, context free manner, metaphor is thought to be particularly 
constrained by social information such that contextual factors may be vital to 
comprehension (Ritchie 2006; Katz, 2005). Contextual information includes knowledge 
of the speaker, setting and introspective qualities like emotional expression and 
interpersonal intent. Contextual information can be explicitly present in an interaction 
(knowledge that you are talking to your best friend) or implicitly inferred (a 
conversational style, like use of irony, that suggests the interaction is amicable; Pexman 
& Zvaigzne, 2004). Therefore, in addition to semantic knowledge, we rely strongly on 
contextual, extralinguistic and pragmatic knowledge to comprehend a metaphorical 
comment. Metaphor is a powerful linguistic tool that is made meaningful by the context 
in which it appears (Cohen, 1978; Horton, 2007). 
Despite the powerful role of contextual information, research has done little to 
assess how a writer might contextualize metaphorical and literal statements. Although 
researchers often provide some contextual information, they tend to present participants 
with short vignettes that end in metaphorical or literal comments and then ask questions 
related to intent or meaning. These vignettes are created based on the researcher’s 
intuition or other assumptions from the literature. Although this technique can be an 
effective way to present metaphorical stimuli (and in fact a method used in Studies 3 and 
4 of this dissertation), it may overlook some important social inferences and 
psychological elements associated with metaphorical language. Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to systematically assess the nature of the contextual information by simply 
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providing participants with metaphorical or literal sentences and asking them to create a 
short, meaningful context (2-4 lines) in which they would find these sentences. The 
analytical emphasis of these studies assesses whether the metaphor and literal contexts 
created by the participants differ in social and emotional content. Study 2 assesses how 
the inclusion of certain types of social and emotional content by the writer relates to his 
or her scores on a ToM test and thus serves to test embodied social effects.   
Although a production study may seem like an obvious first step, to date, few 
researchers have considered this methodology when studying metaphorical language (but 
see Campbell & Katz, 2012; Hussey & Katz, 2006). Additionally, although analyses 
using corpora can provide contextual information, these are difficult tools to use because 
many programs do not provide a way to search for and identify metaphorical instances. 
Researchers who use corpus methodology tend to pick one type of conceptual metaphor 
(e.g., “LIFE IS A JOURNEY”) and search for patterns of use in relevant corpora 
(Deignan, 2008). These methodological constraints limit the generalizability of this type 
of work. In sum, many researchers tend to avoid corpus and production studies because 
these methods involve a host of factors that are difficult to control or quantify.  
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001) 
provides a method to identify patterns of language production. Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count is a text analysis program that outputs the percentage of words from a range 
of different categories (e.g., articles, pronouns, punctuation, emotional words and mental 
state terms called “cognitive mechanisms”). This methodology has been successfully 
used by Campbell and Katz (2012) in determining the requisite context that makes a 
comment sarcastic, and by many others outside of the non-literal language field (led by 
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work from Pennebaker and colleagues). The program divides markers of speech into style 
and content categories. Content (e.g., nouns, verbs and adverbs) refers to what one 
discusses and style (e.g., pronouns) refers to how one is communicating (e.g., formally 
versus interpersonally).  Dividing the analysis of the two studies in this chapter into 
content and style categories provides a nuanced view of the nature of literal and non-
literal expression. Both LIWC categories are intended to capture the psychological 
perspectives of the writer (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003). Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count is thus a good way to objectively quantify social and emotional elements 
of language while retaining experimental control. 
Metaphor in context 
To understand the nature of what might be included in a meaningful metaphorical 
context, consider first the motivation to use metaphor. Recall, Ortony (1975) provides 
three roles of metaphorical language that are largely social in nature because these 
functions are expressive. First, the compactness hypothesis states metaphor enables the 
speaker to say more using fewer words. The metaphor “Juliet is the sun” compacts 
information in a way that directly listing features (e.g., attractive, alluring, bright) of the 
character would not.  Second, metaphor bridges complex or ill-defined abstract concepts 
and the physical world. This expressibility hypothesis suggests metaphor concretizes 
thoughts and feelings (e.g., Love is a drug) and anything else we have trouble expressing 
literally. “Expressibility” functions largely by connecting abstract concepts (love) to 
concrete domains (the physical experience of a drug) and, as a consequence, is 
considered an embodied experience of otherwise abstract language (Gibbs, 1994). The 
third function of metaphor is enhancement of a concept or idea; the so-called vividness 
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hypothesis. Comparing “Juliet” to the “sun” highlights certain perceptual and emotive 
features of both Juliet and the sun, resulting in an expression that is more vivid than a 
literal approximation. In Ortony’s (1975) view, vividness impacts all sensory modalities, 
thus making metaphor especially powerful in conversation. Importantly, associated with 
this function is an often intense emotional and “embodied” experience of the topic of 
discussion (Gibbs, 2006). The research in this chapter explores the latter two hypotheses 
(expressibility and vividness), by analyzing what the writer includes in a metaphorical or 
literal context. 
Ortony (1975, p. 50) sums up his position on the importance of metaphor, stating 
“because of a metaphor’s greater proximity to perceptual experience and consequently its 
greater vividness, the emotive as well as the sensory and cognitive aspects are more 
available”. In fact, Ortony (1975) posits that metaphor provides a closer approximation to 
vivid, emotional experience than a literal expression. Additionally, his work suggests 
metaphor is framed with a communicative intention or psychological effect in mind, thus 
emphasizing metaphor’s utility in interpersonal expression. For instance, inspired by 
these hypotheses, researchers characterize metaphor as a means to inspire strong 
reactions in the listeners (see e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Colston, 2012). This strong 
arousal is arguably due to the combination of emotional content and the “as if” simulation 
process of comprehension, based on the comprehender’s motivation to understand what 
was said (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). In the studies presented in this chapter, the “as if” 
simulation is extended to the writer’s motivation to include certain social elements in 
metaphor contexts. The general idea here is that contextual content will broadly support 
Ortony’s (1975) claims about metaphor. 
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The limited experimental research supporting Ortony’s (1975) hypotheses, 
however, has tended to use pre-constructed short stories that may not capture the ecology 
in which metaphorical and literal language is used. Likewise, researchers often have not 
used adequately controlled stimuli that are matched on important psycholinguistic 
variables (e.g., emotional intensity, use of pronouns or social words). Without matched 
stimuli, one cannot be sure if the expressibility and vividness effects are due to the non-
literal language manipulation or some other psycholinguistic variable. Moreover, some of 
the research has been merely post-hoc and observational. Using tighter experimental 
control, a production study can provide a window into the subtle social effects associated 
with using metaphor. Specifically, participants in the studies in this chapter are given 
metaphorical or literal sentences and asked to create a likely discourse context for each 
sentence. Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count will be used to analyze the differences 
between the two groups. The analytical emphasis in these studies will focus on what the 
writer includes in discourse contexts. 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count content predictions 
The vividness hypothesis suggests writers may include markers of language that 
enhance a metaphorical message in some way.  Ortony (1975) and others (Gibbs, Leggitt 
& Turner, 2002; Kovesces, 2002; Sopory, 2005) tie metaphor to emotion, suggesting a 
metaphor is vivid and memorable partly because of its affective content. An analysis of 
descriptions of emotional experience shows consistent metaphorical patterns of 
expression (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Emotion is metaphorically characterized as losing 
control (e.g. being overcome with emotions), originating in the body (e.g., heartbroken), 
or as an opponent (e.g., struggling with one’s feelings). In fact, some conceptual 
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metaphor theorists claim emotions are understood and expressed wholly through 
metaphorical references to physical and bodily experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Gibbs, Leggitt and Turner (2002) tested the idea that embodied metaphorical 
expressions of emotion convey intense experiences and are thus more strongly felt than 
literal equivalents.  In their study, undergraduate students who listened to statements that 
were either literal (“I was really angry”), conventional metaphor (“I hit the ceiling”) or 
novel metaphor (“I was a live grenade”) rated both metaphor types as more emotionally 
intense than literal equivalents.  Research has also assessed what writers include in 
emotional contexts. When asked to describe emotional autobiographical memories, 
participants tended to use more figurative language than when describing the actions they 
took when experiencing these strong emotions (Fainsibler & Ortony, 1987). The authors 
suggest that metaphor is used because it effectively communicates otherwise abstract 
experiences. Taken together, these perception and production studies show the use of 
metaphor conveys emotions that may be more strongly felt than literal equivalents. 
Moreover, Gibbs, Leggit and Turner (2002) suggest the expression of emotion with 
metaphor serves to convey interpersonal closeness and remind interlocutors of their 
relationship. 
Based on the connection between metaphor and emotion, I intend to examine the 
affective nouns (e.g., happy, sad, angry) participants use in the creation of metaphorical 
and literal contexts. However, given that LIWC (and most other programs of its kind) 
cannot identify metaphor, it may underestimate some of its use when placed into context. 
That is, terms such as “blue”, “cold” and “heart” as well as phrases such as “He’s so into 
playing hockey” are commonly used metaphorically to describe some emotional 
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experience. There are two ways around LIWC’s limitation that I will employ in the two 
studies presented in this chapter. One is to code idiomatic expression of emotion (e.g., “I 
can’t stand it anymore!”). Idioms are social phrases that signal emotions and are 
considered unique ways to express interpersonal closeness (Hopper, Knapp & Scott, 
1981). For instance, idioms are used in intimate relationships to express emotion and 
promote cohesiveness (Hopper, Knapp & Scott, 1981). Additionally, idiomatic speech is 
used to signal one’s social presence in online communities, suggesting this type of speech 
can capture an audience’s attention (e.g., Delfino & Manca, 2007). Idiomatic phrases 
may therefore be used in addition to simple affect nouns in order to emphasize the 
writer’s perspective and insert emotional content.  
Another sign of emotion intensity in text is the use of adverbs. Adverbs add 
emphasis to speech and text and tend to occur with emotionally intense experiences 
(Gayle & Priess, 1999).  They are found in non-literal language use in computer mediated 
communication with friends (Whalen, Pexman & Gill, 2009) and are thus an effective 
method of enhancing emotion while maintaining clarity (Hancock, 2004). Therefore, the 
LIWC adverb category will also be included in the reported analysis. In sum, I anticipate 
participants will insert affect nouns, idiomatic expressions of emotion and adverbs in 
metaphorical contexts as a method of enhancing emotional intensity. Taken together, 
these predictions will serve to test Ortony’s (1975) vividness hypothesis. 
Recall that metaphor also facilitates the expression of abstract thought and 
intention (based on the expressibility hypothesis). To test this hypothesis, analysis will 
focus on content that references cognitive processes (that tend to co-occur with and 
describe emotional experiences: Pennebaker & Stone, 2003). As Ortony (1975) indicated, 
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metaphor is useful in expressing the otherwise inexpressible such as thoughts, intentions 
and imagination. Consequently, many metaphorical expressions deal with abstract and 
intangible experiences.  Brandt and Brandt (2005, p 219) suggest that a powerful function 
of metaphor is the intention “to share some content of thought with an addressee in a 
semiotic exchange”, the result of which is metaphor employed as a social tool. 
Expression of mental content activates ToM and perspective taking in others
3
 (Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2005). Metaphor is likely one process by which we frame our thoughts and 
intentions and make it clear to an audience what we are thinking. In turn, the target of our 
metaphorical statement can experience our thoughts and is able to enact what Gibb and 
Colston (2012) call an “as if” simulation of the speaker’s intention.  
According to Pennebaker (2012), we use cognitive mechanism words such as 
“think”, “feel” and “intend”, when we are conscious of what we are saying in order to 
frame our message (Pennebaker, Slatcher & Chung, 2002).  These words are highly 
important in social perception for a number of reasons (Berry et al., 1997). For instance, 
use of mental state terms is predictive of ToM ability in children (Adrian et al., 2005). 
Cognitive mechanism words tend to be found in social contexts, such as blogs and 
conversation, but less frequently in factual or literal documents such as scientific articles 
and non-emotional writing (Pennebaker, et al., 2007). Greater use of cognitive 
mechanism words has been found with friends compared to strangers (Marsh, Tversky & 
Hutson, 2005). Interestingly, high rates of cognitive mechanism words are also found in 
pretense and lies (Newman, Pennebaker, Barry & Richards, 2003): two processes that are 
                                                          
3
 To anticipate the coming studies, about 30 percent of the correct answers in the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes task (studies 2 through 5 of this dissertation) are classified by LIWC as cognitive mechanism words. 
The Eyes task thus assesses a combination of thoughts and emotions. 
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highly social and require ToM ability to comprehend (Winner et al., 1998). Given that the 
cognitive mechanism category in LIWC includes words such as “imagine”, “intend”, 
“imply” and “infer”, this category is a strong proxy for the expression of intention. Taken 
together, the research suggests these words are social and expressive in nature and 
therefore might be employed in metaphorical contexts. 
 In addition to the categories used as tests of Ortony’s (1975) expressibility and 
vividness hypotheses, a final content category will also be considered. The social 
category deals primarily with non-first person roles (e.g., doctor, lawyer, girl, boy) and 
some social verbs (call, share). On the surface, this seems like an important category for 
comparison between the two language groups. However, the social category is not widely 
reported as a variable that predicts psychological states or social ability. The literature 
shows that the role of “social words” in communication and expression is somewhat 
unclear. Like emotional content and cognitive mechanism words, social words tend to be 
used in blogs but less so in formal, scientific writing (Pennebaker, et al., 2007). However, 
generally speaking, emotional content and cognitive mechanism categories are more 
widely reported as predictors of social and psychological experience than the social 
category. Limited research suggests the influence of social words on social processes is, 
at best, indirect (Pressman & Cohen, 2007). Therefore, although the social category is 
included in the analysis, it should be noted that the investigation of its role is somewhat 
exploratory in nature.  
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Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count: Style predictions 
Style markers (e.g., pronouns) differ from content because they capture the 
manner in which the message is delivered. Compared to content markers, style markers 
tend to go unnoticed in speech, but are socially informative and good predictors of social 
and psychological states (Pennebaker, 2012). Style markers of speech imply (or produce) 
varying degrees of closeness between writer (or speaker) and reader (or listener) and 
therefore may be particularly relevant in conveying content in metaphorical contexts. 
Given that style markers such as pronouns have not been investigated in relation to 
metaphor use, the following predictions are largely exploratory in nature. 
Pennebaker (2012) suggests that, although pronouns are often so rapidly 
processed such that they pass almost unnoticed, they are strongly social and thus highly 
informative elements of conversation. The use of personal pronouns (particularly the first 
person pronoun) is the style marker of interest in the present research because these 
pronouns convey a personal perspective of the writer (Van hell et al., 2005). Texts using 
first person pronouns tend to be highly emotional, suggesting use of pronouns help 
convey the author’s feelings and attitudes. Moreover, personal pronouns “reveal how the 
writers view themselves, their relationships with readers and their relationship to the 
discourse community in which they belong” (Kuo, 1999, p.123). These pronouns enhance 
common ground (Jucker & Smith, 1996) and help an audience embody a speaker or 
writer’s perspective (Brunye, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn & Taylor, 2009). 
Compared to third person pronouns, the use of the first person pronouns creates 
different relationships between the reader and writer, resulting in different cognitive and 
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social effects. “I” pronouns suggest self-disclosure and immediacy (Kuo, 1999) and help 
the writer emphasize his or her own existence in the text (Bartak & Rutter, 1974). Third 
person perspective tends to be more formal and less emotional and reflective 
(Pennebaker, 2012). The psychology qualities of first person pronouns are congruent with 
social elements of metaphor use. Metaphor is an effective way to convey the attitude of 
the writer (Gibbs & Colston, 2012) and may be informal and personal due to its “play on 
words” quality. Therefore, based on the implications of these studies, first person 
pronoun use in metaphorical texts will be considered as indicative of engagement and 
embodied experience of the material. In contrast, literal contexts may be simply 
physically descriptive, formal and use fewer “I” references. 
Summary and Predictions 
 This first study systematically assesses what participants produce in discourse 
context in which they embed metaphoric or literal expressions they have just read. 
Participants in this study are asked to write 2-4 lines of context for metaphorical or literal 
sentences. They are explicitly asked to create a discourse context in which they think the 
target sentence would occur. Additionally, they are told to make their context 
comprehensible. No mention is made of the literal or non-literal nature of the stimuli. 
Given the challenge to create equivalent material, the prompt sentences were taken from 
a recent norming study (Cardillo et al., 2010) and are the best controlled literal and non-
literal stimuli currently available. These simple sentences are written in past tense, are 
about seven words long and are matched on important psycholinguistic variables 
(discussed in greater detail in the methods section). 
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Using LIWC categories, a priori predictions are as follows. Contexts produced in 
response to metaphorical sentences will include more emotional and cognitive content. 
Emotional content in LIWC’s affective category include positive emotion (“happy”), 
negative emotion (“abandon”, “sad”), anxiety (“afraid”), anger (“abuse”) and sadness 
(“ache”). Associated with affect words, participants will use significantly more adverbs 
in the metaphorical condition (very, extremely, truly) (based on work by Hancock, 2004). 
Additionally, idiomatic uses of emotion that LIWC would miss (e.g., “cold”, “blue”) will 
be coded by two raters, with the prediction that the metaphor group will use more 
idiomatic emotional language. Cognitive content includes cognitive mechanisms such as 
“think”, “feel”, “intend” and “imagine”.  Based on the expressibility hypothesis of non-
literal language, I predict greater use of cognitive mechanism words in the metaphor 
condition. Additionally, participants will insert more first person personal pronouns (e.g., 
I) into the metaphorical context as a means to convey their attitude and embodied 
experience of the subject matter. Finally, the social category will also be analyzed with 
the prediction that the metaphor group will use more social words. 
 Predictions of the content produced in response to literal sentences are difficult 
because the literal manipulation acts as a catchall category. Instead of emotional and 
cognitive content, participants in this group are predicted to use simple descriptions of the 
situation (e.g., physical descriptors). Cameron (2008) reports that stretches of literal 
language tend to be physically descriptive in nature (e.g. travel arrangements or meeting 
plans). The LIWC motion category (e.g. “carry”, “jump”, “crawl”) captures “simple, 
concrete actions” (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry & Richard, 2003, p. 667) that are less 
complex and more accessible than cognitive mechanism words. Motion words tend to be 
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used when participants are asked to describe “an object or event in an unemotional way” 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007, p.9). The motion category is thus a logical contrast to the 
metaphor predictions given that if we are not “thinking” or “feeling” we are usually 
“doing”. Literal stimuli are predicted to prompt descriptions of the type of action 
captured by LIWC’s motion category, given that this category tends to describe how 
characters are behaving in text. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two participants (47 females; mean age: 23.34; SD: 7.79) from Western 
University, with English as a first language, were recruited using posters placed around 
campus (36 participants in each group). Two participants were removed from subsequent 
analysis for failing to produce complete, sensible content in the study. Participants 
completed the study online and had their name entered into a draw for a $50 gift card. 
Ethical approval for this experiment is presented in Appendix A. 
Materials 
Stimuli were short sentences, taken from Cardillo et al.’s norms (2010 e.g., 
Metaphorical: The woman dove into her knitting, Literal: The woman dove into the pool. 
See Appendix B for more examples). These sentences are written in third person and are 
matched on familiarity based on 1 (not familiar) to 7 (familiar) ratings (Mmet= 5.15, SD 
= 1.00, Mlit= 5.51, SD = .87, t(30) = 1.11, p = .26) and emotional valence (based on the 
proportion of participants who indicated the stimuli had a positive valence; MMet = .22, 
SD= .23, MLit= .19, SD = .30, t(30) =.30, p = .75). Cardillo et al. (2010) report that the 
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metaphorical sentences generally have good interpretability. To supplement information 
on Cardillo et al.’s (2010) norms, the sentences were analyzed with LIWC and were 
found to be matched for number of pronouns and personal pronouns, affective words, 
adverbs, cognitive mechanism words and social and motion words (see Table 1 for means 
and standard deviations)
4
. The sentences are thus tightly matched and, in fact, are some 
of the best controlled metaphorical stimuli currently available. 
Procedure 
In a between group design, participants were presented with either 16 
metaphorical and 16 literal sentences, one at a time. Participants were provided the 
following instructions: “In this study you will read short sentences and will create a 
context or scenario in which you think these sentences would occur. You will write 
approximately 2-4 lines per scenario. You can write anything you want as long as it is 
able to be comprehended”. Participants were not informed of the literal or non-literal 
nature of these sentences. 
Participants accessed the study through a link they obtained from posters placed 
around the Western university campus. The posters provided tabs with an equal number 
of links to the metaphorical or literal condition. Participants had no way of knowing the 
condition of the study based on the tab they pulled from the poster. Upon accepting the 
terms of consent, they completed the context building task, provided their age, gender 
and first language, and were subsequently debriefed online. 
                                                          
4 Although the literal stimuli tended to have more emotion words, this contrast did not reach significance. The 
difference is not problematic given that the stimuli are matched on the psychological variable of emotional valence 
based on Cardillo et al.’s ratings and are, in any event, in the opposite direction than would be predicted. 
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Table 1 
LIWC analysis of the mean number(standard deviation) of stimuli used in Studies 1 and2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Metaphor Literal 
All Pronouns 5.06 (7.77) 6.10 (10.17) 
Personal Pronoun 5.06 (7.77) 5.06 (7.77) 
She/He pronouns 5.06 (7.77) 5.06 (7.77) 
Adverbs 0.00 (0) 2.08 (5.69) 
Affect 5.06 (9.86) 9.07 (11.95) 
Cognitive mechanisms 4.58 (11.01) 5.06 (7.77) 
Motion .89 (3.57) 1.04 (4.16) 
Social 11.36 (13.22) 10.53 (12.79) 
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Results 
Text analysis: Participants created short narratives similar to those found in other studies 
using LIWC methodology (e.g., Campbell & Katz, 2012). One notepad file was created 
for each participant’s set of 16 responses (for examples of responses from each category 
see Table 2). The metaphorical or literal prompt sentences (if used by the participant) 
were removed from the analysis (following methods similar to those employed by 
Campbell & Katz, 2012). The 2007 LIWC dictionary was used for all of the reported 
analyses. The total word count in the written content did not differ between the two 
groups (metaphor: M = 345.36 words SD =146.84; Literal: M = 326.33, SD = 125.71, 
t(70) =  .59, p = .60). This equivalence indicates that any group differences on the 
predicted factors are not due to differences in word count. 
Idiomatic expression of emotion 
 Two coders (myself and a second person) read through the stories and coded the 
content for idiomatic expressions of emotion that would be missed by LIWC.  Idiomatic 
expressions include words and phrases such as “I couldn’t stand it anymore” and “she 
recoiled”, along with references to the heart and body as the center of feelings. The 
intraclass correlation between the raters was .90, suggesting high agreement (Fleiss, 
1986). The second coder identified metaphorical content that is so entrenched in language 
that it is captured by relevant LIWC categories (e.g., “impressed”) and hence her coding 
overlapped with data reported in the next section. Therefore, the numbers reported are 
based on my coding. Numbers in this section are reported as count data wherein one  
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Table 2 
Examples of responses produced in metaphorical and literal contexts 
 Stimulus Response 
Metaphorical Context   
‘I’ The reception was a snore “I’m so excited to get to the 
presentation, but why are 
they spending so much time 
on things that don’t 
matter?” 
Cognitive Mechanisms The rejection letter was a 
slap 
“She thought she would 
make it into the pet psychic 
academy.” 
Adverbs The case worker trudged 
through the files 
“Though the work was 
tedious, it was extremely 
important” 
Idioms His poetry was a cathartic 
moan 
“Everyone in the class 
could not stand another 
hour of listening to him 
read his poem.” 
Affect The reader raced through 
the novel 
“His hands were sweaty as 
he turned the next page. 
Would it be a happy ending 
or would true love die?” 
Literal Context   
Motion The man raced past the 
empty lot 
“A robber was running after 
a man for his money.” 
Social His only communication 
was a moan 
“A man is being prodded by 
his friends after being found 
passed out after a house 
party. He is half-on the 
sofa, with silver glitter all 
over his chest, holding a 
box of Twinkies.” 
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expression (e.g., “I couldn’t stand it anymore”) is counted as one unit (instead of 
counting the individual words in each trope). 
 As predicted, the metaphor group produced significantly more idiomatic 
expressions of emotion (M = 3.38, SD= 2.90) than the literal group (M = 1.63, SD = 
1.49), t(70) = 3.21, p = .002. In contrast, the literal group remained fairly factual and 
direct, choosing to avoid potentially confusing non-literal styles in their contexts.  
Content differences 
The numbers analyzed in this section are mean percentage
5
 of words in a given 
LIWC category (see Table 3 for all LIWC means and standard deviations). The following 
was observed. The total amount of affect words did not differ between the two groups, 
t(70) =  .96, p = .34. However, participants inserted a greater number of adverbs into their 
metaphorical contexts, t(70) =  2.30, p = .03 (e.g., “It was undeniably satisfying”). 
Additionally, the use of adverbs tended to correlate with the use of affect words in the 
metaphorical group r(34) = .29, p = .07, but not in the literal condition, r(34) = .08, p = 
.68. Taken together, the results suggest that, whereas both groups discussed emotion, the 
discussion in the metaphorical group tended to be more emotionally vivid (through the 
use of adverbs and idiomatic emotional expressions).  
 Additionally, those providing context for the metaphorical prompt sentences used 
significantly more cognitive mechanism words to convey thoughts and feelings (e.g., 
“what people don’t know can’t hurt them- or so he thought”), t(70) =  3.40, p = .001. The 
finding is supportive of the expressibility hypothesis. 
                                                          
5
 All LIWC analyses in this dissertation report percentages.  
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Table 3 
LIWC analysis: Differences between metaphorical and literal contexts for Study 1 
(Standard deviations in brackets) 
 Metaphor Literal 
Adverb 4.24 (1.51)* 3.48 (1.28) 
‘I’ pronoun 1.21 (1.49)* .41 (1.00) 
Cognitive Mechanisms 16.15 (3.60)** 13.09 (3.90) 
 Motion 1.59 (.85)** 2.76 (1.24) 
Affect 6.29 (1.74) 5.94 (1.31) 
Social 13.55 (2.67)** 16.42 (2.93) 
*<.05 **<.01 
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Style differences 
The metaphor group used the “I” pronoun significantly more than the literal group 
(e.g., “I've never read something more hurtful. Emotions are overcoming my body and 
I’ve never felt so hurt”), t(70)=  2.66, p = .009.  
Literal Group 
In contrast to the metaphor group, the literal group used significantly more 
descriptive, action words from the category of motion words (e.g., carry, jump, crawl) 
(e.g., “The woman walked out of the change room and set her stuff down. She then put 
sunscreen on and walked to the deep end”), t(70) = -4.60, p = .001. This pattern of results 
confirms research by Cameron (2008), who suggests literal discourse tends to be 
physically descriptive. The literal group also produced significantly more social words 
than the metaphor group t(70) = -4.33, p = .001 (e.g., “Louis was nervous about meeting 
her parents. He was never good with parents”). In contrast, use of social words in the 
metaphor group tended to be negatively correlated with use of the “I” pronoun (r (34) =    
-.27, p = .11), suggesting the metaphor group inserted themselves in the context in place 
of social words. The same negative relationship is not found the literal group, r (34) = .19 
(p = .26). 
Discussion 
Recall that participants were asked to create a plausible discourse context to make 
a metaphorical or literal expression meaningful. The goal of this study was to 
systematically assess the claim that metaphorical contexts are more socially and 
emotionally expressive than literal equivalents. More broadly, the study tests the idea that 
48 
 
 
 
writers use metaphorical contexts as a medium to express an attitude and intention in 
their writing (Gibbs, 1994).  
The results show that participants provided different content when creating a 
metaphorical or literal scenario, despite the prompt sentences being closely matched on 
content and valence. Contrary to initial predictions, participants in the metaphor group 
did not use more affect words (e.g., “sad”, “happy”) compared to the literal group. 
Participants in the metaphor group did, however, use more emotional idiomatic language 
and adverbs. This finding is consistent with research that shows people use idiomatic 
language to express emotion and inspire emotional reactions in others (Delfino & Manca, 
2007; Hopper, Knapp & Scott, 1981). Greater use of adverbs and the positive correlation 
between the use of adverbs and affect words are consistent with research that shows 
adverbs co-occur with descriptions of intense emotional experience (Gayle & Priess, 
1999). Additionally, the findings are consistent with research that shows adverbs are 
inserted in text to emphasize content and cue non-literal intent (Whalen, Pexman & Gill, 
2009). Taken together, use of idiomatic emotional language and adverbs found in the 
present study support the prediction that metaphor contexts are used to express a vivid 
emotional experience to others. The findings are congruent with Ortony’s (1975) 
vividness hypothesis.   
Participants in the metaphor group also drew attention to abstract thoughts and 
intentions through a greater use of cognitive mechanisms words compared to the literal 
group. Previous research shows that cognitive mechanism words tend to co-occur with 
emotional experience and are used to draw attention to the goals of the message or share 
the writer’s thoughts (Pennebaker, Slatcher & Chung, 2002). Additionally, past research 
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shows use of these types of mental state terms tends to activate Theory of Mind processes 
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2005). The finding of greater use of cognitive words by the 
metaphor group is thus supportive of the idea that participants used metaphorical context 
as a medium through which to express abstract thought, ostensibly to an audience (Berry 
et al., 1997).   More broadly, use of cognitive mechanism words in the present study is 
supportive of the expressibility hypothesis that states metaphor is used to express abstract 
thoughts and emotions (Ortony, 1975).  
As predicted, participants in the metaphor group used significantly more personal 
pronouns. This prediction was largely exploratory in nature, but can be interpreted in 
light of some of the research on personal pronouns. Past research shows that the “I” 
pronoun is used when writers intend to informally express their experience with the text, 
insert their opinion and connect with an ostensible audience (Kuo, 1999; Van Hell et al., 
2005). In the present research, the use of the “I” pronoun in the metaphor group suggests 
an obvious expression of the intention of the message and as though the writers are 
attempting to speak to a putative reader. Additionally, the finding suggests that the 
participants were embodying the context they created by inserting themselves in it 
(Brunye et al., 2009).  
In contrast to the metaphorical group, the literal group used more “motion” words. 
These words are simple, physical descriptors (Newman et al., 2003). This finding can be 
in interpreted in light of past research that shows literal discourse tends to be physically 
descriptive (Cameron, 2008). Additionally, use of the motion category suggests that the 
literal group wrote with directness and less complexity in thought (Newman et al., 2003).  
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Unexpectedly, the literal group also used more words from LIWC’s social 
category. The social category includes third person roles (e.g., mother, father, brother). 
Recall that the social category does not seem to be widely predictive of psychological 
states. In the present study, greater use of words from the social category by the literal 
group can be interpreted in contrast to the metaphor group, who tended to use more “I” 
pronouns in place of this category (based on the negative correlation between the use of 
social words and the first person pronoun in the metaphor group). In contrast, the literal 
group’s use of the social category invokes a third person perspective. This perspective 
suggests writing was more formal and less interpersonal (Pennebaker, 2012). Therefore, 
although both contexts had some social elements, the metaphor contexts were emotional 
and interpersonally expressive whereas literal contexts were physically descriptive.  
Taken together, the differences between the two groups can be interpreted in light 
of past research that shows cognitive mechanism words, adverbs and idiomatic language 
are all used to a greater extent with people to whom we are socially and emotionally close 
(e.g. friends or romantic partners see: Whalen, Pexman & Gill, 2009; Marsh, Tversky & 
Hutson, 2005). Because these markers tend to signal intimacy, the context participants 
created for metaphorical language in the present study suggest the content was framed 
with an interpersonal intention in mind. Participants in the metaphor condition used 
cognitive words (“think” and “feel”) and idiomatic phrases that suggest closeness to the 
putative reader. These findings contrast the literal group, who tended to describe social 
actions using words from LIWC’s social category. The use of the social category does 
not necessarily suggest closeness to the reader, but appears to act as merely descriptive of 
the events in the story. In sum, the findings from Study 1 support the contention that there 
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are important features of metaphor that may have been overlooked in previous research. 
Specifically, the findings show social and emotionally intense elements in figurative 
language contexts, supporting Ortony’s (1975) vividness and expressibility hypotheses.  
It could be argued that the greater use of words from the social category in the 
literal group is more consistent with social expression and works against the general 
hypotheses of this dissertation. Given the limitations of the social category discussed in 
the introduction of this chapter, I do not take this position. I argue that the metaphorical 
group used other important social markers (e.g., cognitive mechanisms and idioms) to 
emphasize interpersonal perspectives. Likewise, the negative correlation between social 
words and the “I” pronoun in the metaphor group suggests this group used personal 
pronouns in place of social words in order to express their own experience of the text. 
Therefore, overall, the metaphor context had more social elements than literal contexts. 
The next study in this chapter further investigates social and emotional expression in 
metaphorical contexts to provide additional support to the social hypothesis of metaphor 
that I am testing. 
The results of the first study suggest that metaphorical contexts are highly social 
and framed with another’s perspective in mind. These findings imply that the writer’s 
motivation to include certain content differs between metaphorical and literal prompts. A 
related question, then, is what goes on in the writer’s mind when creating these contexts? 
Presumably, the creator of metaphorical contexts embodies an “as if” simulation that 
includes the desire to express certain thoughts and emotions to others. To assess the 
nature of this simulation, the next study incorporates the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
task (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001).  A different set of participants will once again create 
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discourse contexts. This task will be followed by the Eyes task. Recall that a basic 
premise of embodied cognition research suggests that relevant information simulated in 
one task can show effects on another. This methodology will help determine if writing 
metaphorical contexts “spills over” to scores on a measure of social intelligence, such 
that participants in the metaphor group are prompted to be more sensitive to others’ 
thoughts and feelings and thus score higher on the Eyes task.  
Additionally, given the tendency to use more “I” pronouns, the next study also 
assesses participants’ tendency toward emotional self-disclosure using questions adapted 
from the emotional self-disclosure scale (Snell, Miller & Belk, 1988). These scales assess 
the likelihood of expressing happy or angry states to a same sex friend. Previous research 
has shown that these subscales are reliable measures of social expression (see e.g., Snell, 
Miller, Belk, 1998). Once again, participants will respond to these scales after they 
perform the writing task. This methodology will determine if the act of creating 
metaphorical contexts prompts greater emotional self-disclosure compared to literal 
contexts. 
Study 2 
The working hypothesis of this dissertation is that metaphor has social effects. 
The first study shows that the metaphorical and literal contexts differed systematically on 
social and expressive variables. Using the same writing task with the same stimuli, Study 
2 incorporates two individual differences measures that are correlated with social 
sensitivity and interpersonal expression (The Eyes task and emotional self-disclosure). 
The second study of this dissertation tests the idea that social effects result from the 
53 
 
 
 
writer’s expression of his or her perspective or attitude (Gibbs, 1994). That is, what the 
writer embodies while creating metaphorical contexts can transfer to these measures of 
social intelligence.  
Recall there is good reason why metaphor (and its associated context) might be 
more strongly embodied than literal language. For instance, Ortony’s (1975) hypotheses 
suggest that metaphor is used for communicative purposes such as making a comment 
more vivid and expressing abstract thoughts and intentions to others. Ritchie (2006) 
suggests that embodied “introspective qualities” like intention and emotional content are 
activated when one produces or interprets metaphorical comments. Extending Ritchie’s 
(2006) premise, Gibbs and Colston (2012) posit an “as if” simulation of others’ thoughts 
and feelings when comprehending metaphorical comments. This simulation of thoughts 
and feelings likely occurs with both the speaker and target of the message (Gibbs, 1994). 
Their work suggests a writer might simulate another’s perspective when he or she creates 
a metaphorical context. Taken together, the literature supports the premise that 
metaphorical contexts are motivated by the writer’s intention to capture the audience 
cognitively and emotionally. 
In this second study, Ritchie’s (2006) and Gibbs and Colston’s (2012) work is 
extended to the intention of the written message that participants provide given 
metaphorical and literal prompts. Specifically, I test the idea that metaphorical contexts 
invite writers to simulate others’ perspectives and prompt them to use emotive content 
that would engage an ostensive audience. This simulation will be assessed implicitly with 
the inclusion of the Eyes task. Recall, the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2011) is a first 
order ToM task that requires participants to correctly identify emotions expressed in sets 
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of eyes (see Appendix C for examples). Scores on this task have been shown to be 
independent of IQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and general intelligence scores (Richell et 
al., 2003), as well as independent of general executive functioning tasks (Gregory et al., 
2002) and Stroop interference tasks (Mimura, Oeda, & Kawamura, 2006).  The Eyes test 
thus measures “subtle impairments in social intelligence, in otherwise normally 
intelligent adults” (p. Baron-Cohen et al. 2001, p  247). Although superficially, the task 
seems unrelated to metaphor production, eyes can serve as a powerful social tool that 
show “different levels of signal value depending on the status, disposition and emotional 
state of the sender and receiver of such signals” (Emery, 2000, p. 581). The ability to read 
others’ facial expressions is related to social astuteness and ToM skill.  
To assess the premise that elements used in the metaphorical condition are framed 
with another’s perspective in mind, Study 2 investigates the relationship between the use 
of social LIWC variables (affect and cognitive mechanisms) and scores on the Eyes task. 
If metaphor prompts written content that is designed to engage an ostensive audience, this 
content may be related to general social intelligence, like ability to identify emotions in 
others. Therefore, scores on the Eyes task are predicted to uniquely and positively 
correlate with the percentage of affect and cognitive mechanism words used in the 
metaphorical but not literal condition. Additionally, if metaphor prompts a stronger 
embodied “as if” simulation of other perspectives, participants in this condition may 
actually do better on the Eyes task compared to the literal group. Therefore, overall group 
performances on the Eyes task will be assessed with the prediction that the metaphor 
group will be more accurate at identifying emotions in this task. Taken together, this 
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analysis will serve to test the “as if” simulation of the writers and extend the findings of 
Study 1. 
The results of Study 1 also showed participants in the metaphor group inserted 
themselves in the scenarios they created and did so to a greater extent than those in the 
literal group (with greater use of the “I” pronoun). The metaphor group, in the first study, 
was more likely to embody the context and see themselves in it. It is possible that writing 
metaphorical contexts prompted the desire to self-disclose. To test the relation between 
the willingness to disclose personal emotional experience and written content, two scales 
from the emotional self-disclosure scale were included in Study 2 (Snell, Miller & Belk, 
1988). The ten questions assessed the willingness to disclose times when one is feeling 
happy and times when one is angry to same sex friends using 1-5 Likert ratings (see 
Appendix D). The second study assessed differences in self-disclosure between the two 
groups. Additionally, the correlations between certain LIWC categories (“I” pronouns 
and affect) and scores on the disclosure task were considered. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Sixty-nine participants from Western University (49 females, Mean age 18.00, SD 
= 2.40), with English as a first language, took part in the study. Participants completed 
the study online for course credit. Once they signed up, they were provided a link that 
randomly assigned them to a metaphor (n = 33) or literal (n = 36) condition with the 
related counter-balancing of the individual differences measures. Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) report that scores on the Eyes task in undergraduate and normal populations fall 
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between 17 and 35 out of a possible 36. Five participants were eliminated from 
subsequent analysis because their scores fell below 17. The eliminated participants also 
generally failed to produce complete content in the writing portion of the study (i.e., they 
produced nonsense or one word answers).  
Participants were told they were going to complete a writing task followed by two 
questionnaire tasks. They were not made aware of the social nature of these questionnaire 
tasks. The procedure employed for the context creation task was the same as Study 1. 
Participants first completed the writing task followed by the addition of the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes task and the emotional self-disclosure task (counterbalanced). Upon 
completion, participants were debriefed online. Ethical approval for this experiment is 
presented in Appendix E. 
Results 
 As in Study 1, one wordpad file was created for each participant’s set of results 
and analyzed with LIWC. Once again, target sentences were removed from the analysis 
(if they were used by the participants). Again results show that participants used the same 
number of words in metaphorical (M = 383.94, SD = 144.62) and literal (M = 329.91, SD 
= 135.53) conditions, t(67)= 1.60, p = .12. This equivalence indicates that any group 
differences in content are not due to word count differences. It is important to note, 
unlike Study 1, this difference is borderline, with participants tending to produce more 
content in the metaphor group. 
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Replication of Study 1 
Replicating Study 1 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations), participants 
in the metaphor context building condition used significantly more cognitive mechanism 
words, t(67) = 4.22, p = .001. As in Study 1, participants in both groups used an equal 
number of affect words, t(67) = .27, p =.78, but once again, the metaphor group used 
significantly more idiomatic emotional expressions (M = 1.70, SD= 1.77) than those in 
the literal group (M = .69, SD = .82), t(67) = 3.14, p = .003 (with the intraclass correlation 
of .90 between raters).  Additionally, once again adverbs tended to be inserted to a greater 
extent in metaphorical context, although this time the contrast failed to reach 
significance, t(67) = 1.09, p = .24. Greater use of the “I” pronoun by the metaphor group 
failed to replicate, t(67) = -.98, p = .35. As in Study 1, the literal group used more motion 
verbs, t(67) = -5.28. The use of social words did not differ between the two groups; literal 
(M = 15.20, SD = 2.73), metaphor (M = 14.06, SD = 3.08), t(67) = -1.67, p = .10. The use 
of social words is borderline, with the literal group once again tending to use more. 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task 
 The website’s randomization resulted in more participants completing the self-
disclosure task first and the Eyes task second. Therefore, order of the task was included 
as a covariate in overall group difference analyses. Participants in the metaphor group did 
reliably better on the Eyes task (M = 27.69, SD = 3.13) than those in the literal group (M 
= 25.75, SD = 4.30); F(1, 66) = 4.22, p = .04. Performance on the Eyes task was 
significantly positively correlated with the percentage of affective words used in the 
metaphorical condition, r(31) =.39, p = .03. No such correlation was found with the  
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Table 4 
LIWC Analysis: Mean scores of content used in metaphorical and literal contexts for 
Study 2 (standard deviations ) 
 Metaphor Literal 
Adverb 3.97 (1.62) 3.53 (1.65) 
‘I’ pronoun .26 (1.02) .57 (1.49) 
Cognitive Mechanisms 15.96 (2.98)** 12.32 (4.05) 
 Motion 1.77 (.76)** 3.10 (1.27) 
Affect 5.83 (1.42) 5.72 (1.60) 
Social 14.06 (3.08) 15.20 (2.73) 
*<.05 **<.01 
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literal group, r(34) = -.03, p =.82. Performance on the Eyes task did not correlate with the 
percentage of cognitive mechanism words used in either group, (Metaphor: r(31) = .02, p 
= .90; Literal: r(34)= -.001, p =.99). To explore the potential role of social words, I 
correlated that category with scores on the Eyes task. Performance on the Eyes task did 
not correlate with words from the social category in either group, (Metaphor: r(31)= .05, 
p = .78; Literal: r(34) = .02, p = .88). 
Self-disclosure 
Recall two scales adapted from the emotional self-disclosure task (Snell, Miller & 
Belk, 1988; see Table 5 for all correlations) were used in this study (e.g., On a scale from 
1-5, what is the likelihood you would talk about times you are feeling angry with a same 
sex friend?). Neither scale correlated with affect words used in the metaphor or literal 
condition nor with participants’ Eyes scores in the metaphorical or literal condition. 
Scores on these disclosure scales did not correlate with the use of the “I” pronoun in 
either condition, likely because of the low use of first person pronouns. Overall, metaphor 
and literal groups did not differ on their tendency towards self-disclosure on happy, F(1, 
66) = .01, p =.90,  or angry scales, F(1, 66) = 2.24, p = .13. The mean for happy 
disclosure in the metaphor group was 4.32 (SD = .63); the literal mean was 4.31 (SD 
=.78). The mean for angry disclosure were 3.36 (SD = .74) in the metaphor group and 
3.05 (SD = 1.01) in the literal group
6
. 
 
                                                          
6
 The participants’ scores on angry self disclosure are similar to the numbers Snell, Miller and Belk (1988) 
report. However, scores on the happy self-disclosure subscale found in the present work are somewhat 
higher than what those authors report. 
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Table 5 
Correlations of happy and angry self-disclosure subscales to LIWC variables and the 
Eyes task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Happy Angry 
 Literal Metaphor Literal Metaphor 
Affect -.03 -.16 -.005 -.02 
I  -.21* .19* .08 .20 
Eyes -.30 -.13 -.20 -.08 
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Discussion 
 Replicating Study 1, LIWC analysis shows participants in the metaphor group 
used more emotional idiomatic language and cognitive mechanism words compared to 
the literal group. These findings can be interpreted in light of research that shows 
idiomatic language and cognitive mechanism words are used to express abstract thought 
and emotion to others (e.g., Pennebaker, 2012). Like Study 1, those providing context for 
literal prompts used significantly more motion words that, as Newman et al. (2003) 
indicate, are simple, descriptive words. As in Study 1, neither group differed on the 
number of affect words they used. Thus, Study 2 generally replicates the content findings 
of Study 1. 
Greater use of idiomatic expressions and cognitive mechanism words suggests the 
contexts the participants provided in the metaphor condition were emotionally vivid and 
expressed abstract thought. These findings are generally supportive of Ortony’s (1975) 
expressibility and vividness hypotheses.  Additionally, the use of idiomatic language and 
expression of thought can be interpreted in light of research that shows idiomatic 
language allows the writer to insert his or her personality into their writing (Delfino & 
Manca, 2007). Likewise, cognitive mechanism words tend to be used with friends (e.g, 
Marsh, Tversky & Hutson, 2005), further supporting the contention that metaphor 
prompts an interpersonal style of communication. Metaphor contexts therefore contain 
social elements and are used to express abstract thought.  It seems that participants who 
created these contexts were conscious of the intention of the message, resulting in writing 
that had social content.  
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Recall the Eyes task was included in this study to determine the reason 
participants might insert social and emotional elements into the metaphorical contexts 
they created. The first finding to note is that participants in the metaphorical condition 
did better on the Eyes task compared to the literal group. The metaphor group was thus 
more accurate in identifying emotions in others. This finding can be interpreted in light of 
previous research that suggests that writers may simulate another’s perspective when they 
include emotional or cognitive content (e.g., Gibbs & Colston, 2012). The finding that the 
metaphor group was more accurate on the Eyes task suggests stronger activation of ToM 
processes prompted by the creation of metaphoric context compared to the literal context. 
Activation of ToM during the writing task suggests the content that the metaphor group 
included was intended to express social and emotional information to others. The finding 
that the metaphor group did better on the Eyes task ultimately suggests metaphor prompts 
social effects that, up to now, have been overlooked in the literature. 
The second finding to note is that the use of emotion words (e.g., sad, happy, 
angry) by the metaphor group correlated with the Eyes task, despite the fact that overall 
percentage of affect words did not differ between the two groups. These results suggest 
context associated with metaphor prompt a type of emotional expression that is highly 
social and framed with Ortony’s (1975) psychological effects in mind. In contrast, the 
creation of literal contextual information did not activate ToM processes nor motivate 
affective content as strongly as metaphorical language. Once again, these data suggest 
metaphorical scenarios orient the writer to an ostensive reader and a consciousness of the 
emotional impact of the message. The writers in the metaphor group were, at some level 
conscious of the idea that what they wrote was intended to be understood by others and 
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thus included emotional content for that reason. The literal group, in contrast, was not 
conscious of an ostensive audience to the same degree.  
Why might writing metaphorical context result in effects on the Eyes task? 
Writing tasks are often used in psychological research to induce emotional frames of 
mind in the participants (e.g., Pennebaker, 2012) or to assess feelings (Lepore, 1997). 
Writing studies show these effects because the writer embodies (and re-lives) certain 
emotional experiences (Barsalou, 1999). I extend the embodied effects of writing tasks to 
the metaphorical contexts participants created in this study. It is likely that writing 
metaphorical context prompted an “as if” simulation connected to general social and 
emotional processes like ToM. That is, participants simulated perspective taking, the act 
of story-telling and emotional introspective qualities. The finding that participants in the 
metaphor group did significantly better on the Eyes tasks suggests the content produced 
by the metaphor group activated a social consciousness and desire to express intention. 
Therefore, at some level, they were conscious of the idea that what they wrote was 
intended to be understood by others. The communicative potential of what they wrote 
arguably prompted a deployment of attention to social contexts more strongly than those 
creating literal contexts. The result of this deployment to social contexts was higher 
scores on a measure of social intelligence. Other relevant LIWC variables (cognitive 
mechanism and social words) did not correlate with this task, suggesting the primary goal 
of participants’ written work was to express an emotionally vivid sentiment to others.  
Recall participants also completed a self-disclosure measure (Snell, Miller & 
Belk, 1988). This measure was included to determine if the act of writing metaphorical 
context prompted higher ratings of the participants’ own self-disclosure. Participants in 
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both the metaphor and the literal groups reported they were willing to self-disclose 
personal information and disclose times when they were happy or angry to same sex 
friends. The groups did not, however, differ from each other on mean willingness to self-
disclose (on either scale). Metaphor did not promote a greater willingness to self-disclose, 
as was initially predicted. Emotional self-disclosure (both happy and angry subscales) did 
not correlate with the LIWC variables of interest (e.g., personal pronouns or affect) in 
either group (see Table 5). Therefore, any tendency towards self or emotional disclosure 
in the writing task did not “spill over” to higher scores on these scales.  
Although the core findings of Study 1 replicated in the second study, it is 
important to note some of the effects did not replicate. The second study failed to show 
greater use of the “I” pronoun and adverbs in the metaphor group. I can only speculate on 
the differences between the two samples. The first study was run in the summer semester 
and advertised broadly to both undergraduate and graduate students. The group in the 
first study was slightly older (mean age = 23.34 vs. mean age =18.00) and likely had 
additional years of writing experience compared to the second sample. Moreover, 
participants in the first study were likely intrinsically motivated to complete the task 
because the pay-off was a 1 in 72 chance to win a prize. The second sample consisted 
solely of first year psychology students who received a course credit regardless of how 
motivated they were to complete the study. Moreover, anecdotally speaking, the writing 
in the first study seemed to have fewer grammatical and spelling errors suggesting greater 
consciousness of the content. It is therefore possible that some of the differences between 
metaphorical and literal language are found when the writers are more engaged with the 
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task and have more experience with writing for an ostensive audience (as, presumably, 
the upper year students in the first study did).  
General Discussion for Studies 1 and 2 
 The two studies assessed the social nature of metaphorical contexts. Ortony 
(1975) proposed that metaphor has interpersonal expressive qualities that convey abstract 
thought and enhance vividness in communication. I characterize these effects as social in 
nature. Metaphor is thought to be particularly socially informative because 
comprehension involves a simulation of introspective qualities such as emotional content 
(Ritchie, 2006) and the intention of the message (Cohen, 1978). In the two studies 
presented in this chapter, I tested the idea that 1) the contexts in which metaphor is used 
are highly social and emotional and 2) that, due to social and emotional content, the 
creation of metaphor contexts impacts other social tasks resulting in social effects. These 
social effects were measured with the inclusion of two individual differences measures 
(the Eyes task and the emotional self-disclosure scale). 
Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the claim that metaphorical contexts differ on 
social and emotional variables. LIWC content analysis showed that participants used 
language that was more vivid (idiomatic language, adverbs for emphasis) and expressed 
abstract thought (e.g., cognitive mechanism words) when creating meaningful contexts in 
which metaphor is employed. The second study also provides support for the claim that 
the creation of meaningful metaphorical contexts affects other social tasks.  The 
expression of emotion (use of affect words in Study 2) was correlated with a ToM task 
wherein participants were required to identify the emotions expressed in sets of eyes. 
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Additionally, participants in the metaphor group did better on the Eyes task than those in 
the literal condition. In sum, although both literal and metaphorical language can be 
socially informative, the current findings suggest metaphor and its associated context 
more strongly orient the writer to their target audience compared to literal discourse.  
The novel contribution of these findings should be highlighted. First, Ortony’s 
(1975) hypotheses have not been adequately tested using experimentally controlled 
stimuli. Studies 1 and 2 suggest these hypotheses may be best interpreted in light of the 
interpersonal expression associated with metaphor. Additionally, to date, no research has 
examined ToM processes in a normal adult population using a metaphor context 
production study. In fact, few researchers have experimentally shown the social 
consequences of metaphor production. The current work suggests metaphorical stimuli 
prompted a deployment to social contexts to which it can be used, and supports 
researchers’ (Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006) speculation on the role of pragmatic knowledge 
that informs metaphor context production and interpretation. The research in this chapter 
is broadly supportive of the role of context and more specifically, the activation of 
cognitive and emotional information in metaphor context production and comprehension. 
In sum, the results are novel and represent a first attempt at explaining why we might 
choose to use non-literal language to communicate ideas to others. 
 In Study 2, the metaphor group performed better on the Eyes task than the literal 
group. These finding support Ritchie’s (2006) speculation that metaphor use requires 
simulation that includes emotional content and intention. The findings are also generally 
supportive of Gibbs and Colston’s (2012) work. These authors propose an “as if” 
simulation that allows one to take another’s perspective in a way that may be unique to 
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non-literal language. This “as if” simulation presumably requires general social abilities 
such as those required for ToM. The results presented here suggest metaphor activates 
ToM and result in a deployment of attention to social contexts.  More broadly, the results 
suggest metaphor may act as a point in conversation or reading to draw attention to one’s 
motivation or inspire reactions in others. Extended processing of metaphor, as in 
fictitious narratives, may prompt a mode of thought that is distinct from more literal 
modes (e.g., Bruner, 1986; Gerrig 1993). This story-telling mode allows the writer or 
reader to strongly simulate interpersonal knowledge and may explain why the metaphor 
group scored higher on the Eyes task.  
 The results also speak to the special communicative elements of metaphor. Early 
theories on metaphor suggested metaphor comprehension and production involved extra 
or “special” cognitive work (e.g., Ortony, 1975). Proponents of these theories suggest 
that metaphor is special in that it allows the speaker to express what is not easily 
expressed with literal language (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). The nature of this cognitive 
work has been, at best, underdeveloped. Researchers, at different times, have suggested 
that imageability, familiarity, expressibility and vividness are important components of 
comprehension that may make metaphor “special” (e.g., Ortony, 1975; Katz et al.,1988). 
The first studies in this dissertation suggest that this extra cognitive work is, at least in 
part, social in nature. Metaphor orients a writer to consider his or her audience and the 
impact of the message. Therefore, non-literal language provides a unique way to express 
an interpersonal stance and results in social effects (like higher scores on the Eyes task). 
 There is one potential confound in the two studies presented in this chapter. It is 
not clear whether reading the metaphor on its own, or producing the associated context, 
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or both, impacted the Eyes task. For instance, use of affect words in the metaphor 
condition, and not metaphor itself, correlated with Eyes scores. Although I believe both 
reading metaphor and producing context play a role in the results, the data presented here 
cannot disentangle the roles played by each. Therefore, the next studies exert greater 
experimental control on the contextual information by matching contexts between 
metaphorical and literal language (Studies 3 and 4) or removing it completely (Study 5).  
In sum, the two studies in this chapter address what writers insert in metaphorical 
text to make that content emotionally and cognitively vivid. The research prompts the 
question: what do readers infer from metaphorical expressions? The next chapter 
examines the perception of closeness between interlocutors and emotionality in text. 
Using methods typically found in the non-literal language literature, participants will read 
experimentally controlled text that differ only in one literal/non-literal statement and 
answer questions on relevant social variables. This methodology will further explore the 
idea that metaphor expresses social information and conveys emotional intensity. 
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Chapter Three 
Study 3 
 The two studies presented in the previous chapter show that participants created 
contexts for metaphors that were social and emotional in nature. The number of affect 
words produced in the metaphor condition correlated with scores on a measure of social 
ability (the Eyes task), suggesting that writers embodied others’ perspectives resulting in 
social effects. These effects were not found in the literal condition, where content was 
direct (based on low use of idiomatic emotional language) and participants lacked a 
desire to express emotional and cognitive content to others (as shown by lower use of 
cognitive mechanisms). The studies in this chapter extend the idea that metaphor conveys 
a greater emotional intensity and interpersonal closeness to the readers of such 
comments. Although the first studies assessed what the writers included in a metaphorical 
context to convey social and emotional information, it is not clear what the reader infers 
from metaphorical language. Moreover, do the inferences required in interpreting 
metaphorical language relate to social ability like ToM? Asking participants questions 
about their experience of metaphorical and literal texts will assess what the readers infer 
from non-literal language use.  
In the studies reported next, participants will read pre-written contexts (that 
include a non-literal language manipulation) and answer questions assessing relevant 
social inferences using likert type scales (e.g., how close are these two speakers?). This 
methodology has been widely used in language research to assess what readers infer in 
short written work and is considered especially useful in quantifying interpretations of 
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non-literal language (see e.g. Bowes & Katz, 2011; Horton 2007; Gibbs, Leggitt & 
Turner, 2002 for examples). It should be noted that, following standard experimental 
procedure, the discourse contexts used in the present studies are kept the same and the 
only difference between the conditions is the target statement. Therefore, this 
methodology eliminates differences in the type of information found in the context 
building studies described in the previous chapter (e.g., greater use of cognitive 
mechanism words and adverbs). Keeping discourse context the same except for the last 
sentence ensures differences are due to the target itself and its interpretation within the 
preceding context. I used this approach to retain experimental control and stay consistent 
with other work in the non-literal language field. The focus in the studies presented in 
this chapter is on the inferences drawn by the participants reading metaphorical and 
literal targets when those targets are not supported by differences in the preceding 
context. A secondary question is whether, in the absence of textual markers associated 
with metaphorical expression, the use of metaphor still conveys social information. 
 Answers to questions like the ones posed in these studies are considered 
representative of some of the general considerations involved in determining the 
motivation of the characters in text. The questions used here assess two related aspects of 
social cognition. Three questions assess ToM processes or the ability to identify thoughts 
and feelings in others. Related to ToM, two questions also assess the ability to reflect on 
one’s own thoughts and feelings (metacognition; Flavell, 2000). To date only two studies 
(Gibbs, Leggitt & Turner, 2002; Horton, 2007) have examined the perception of 
metaphor using social and emotional questions. The work presented here will extend 
these findings through the inclusion of the Eyes task. 
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The addition of the Eyes task is intended to explore the relation of general social 
skills to the perception of metaphor (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Recall, metaphor 
interpretation is thought to require emotive and cognitive inferences in communicative 
discourse (e.g., Ritchie, 2006). Because of these inferences, metaphor may involve 
perspective taking and other related social skills. Therefore, connected to the ability to 
interpret metaphor is the general ability to attend to and process social information. Here, 
I test the idea that the perception of emotional intensity and interpersonal closeness 
associated with metaphor is related to general social intelligence such as ToM. The 
prediction follows: participants who perceive greater closeness and emotionality when 
characters speak metaphorically should also be more accurate at identifying emotions in 
sets of eyes.  
In the studies presented in this chapter, metaphorical and literal sentences are 
written into discourse contexts in which two characters interact. Research has shown that 
readers infer extra-linguistic, pragmatic information from even short pieces of writing 
(e.g., Horton, 2007). For instance, use of novel metaphor suggests the writer is male 
(Hussey & Katz, 2009) whereas use of indirect and affective language is perceived as 
feminine even in the absence of explicit mention of gender (Mulac, Bradac & Gibbons, 
2001). In fact, Katz (2005) suggests a number of different constraints facilitate 
metaphorical interpretation in reading tasks, including perception of a speaker’s 
occupation, status and gender. This type of information is subsumed under pragmatics of 
language – the host of elements that go beyond sentence level information to aid 
comprehension. 
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 Reading thus involves much more than a simple interpretation of the words on the 
page. Comprehension requires a considerable amount of extralinguistic and pragmatic 
knowledge. In fact, without this inferential, background knowledge, some researchers 
suggest that readers would never be able to reach a coherent meaning of the text 
(Marmolejo-Ramos, De Juan, Gygax & Madden, 2009). Classic research shows that, 
during the reading process, we first form a surface-based model of the words on the page, 
followed by a textbase model resolving structural ambiguities. Relevant to the studies in 
this chapter is the ensuing situation model (e.g., Zwann, 1999) that incorporates 
inferences about the text. It is at this point in the reading comprehension process that 
readers can infer gender, personality traits (Rapp, Gerrig & Prentice, 2001) and emotional 
states (Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992) of the characters. All of these 
inferences are motivated by a desire to understand what is happening in the text beyond 
the words on the page. 
The questions in the two studies presented here are designed to draw the reader’s 
attention to different perspectives and emotional content that is not presented explicitly 
but can only be inferred from the written contexts. When we take characters’ 
perspectives, we can relate to their thoughts and feelings and make inferences about their 
motivation (e.g., Zwann & Radvansky, 1998; Oately, 1999). Inspired by the embodied 
perspective, recent research suggests that actions and emotions of the text can leak into 
the reader’s perceptual and emotional responses. For instance, a common technique to 
induce positive or negative mood is to have participants read stories with those 
corresponding emotions.  One theory for why this technique works effectively is that 
readers simulate or embody what is happening in the text, such that they reenact it using 
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emotion processing areas of the brain (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Zwann, 1999). Additionally, 
description of characters’ emotions can exert a subtle, but powerful effect on the reader. 
For instance, Gernsbacher, Goldsmith and Robertson (1992) had participants read stories 
that implied an emotional state in the characters (e.g., guilt). Participants then read a short 
sentence that either included a congruent or incongruent emotional word. The sentences 
with the congruent emotion were read faster than the incongruent condition, despite that 
word not having appeared in the initial story. Participants in this study inferred an 
emotion even when the task did not seem to require it. Taken together, the results are 
suggestive of embodied and inferential cognition even when participants read short 
sentences. 
Gibbs (2006, all quotes from page 200-201) states the embodied experience of 
language and reading helps the reader “create meaningful construals by simulating how 
objects and actions depicted in language relate to embodied possibilities”. Thus, readers 
use their embodied experience to “soft-assemble” meaning, rather than merely activate 
pre-existing abstract, conceptual representations. Gibbs and Colston (2012) extend this 
experience to an interpersonal level of communication, proposing an “as if” simulation to 
interpret others’ feelings and perspectives.  In fact, people who report that they read a lot 
of fiction tend to embody experiences and take others perspectives so frequently that they 
tend to score high on social measures such as the Eyes task (Oatley, 1999). 
All language and discourse is ultimately social, requiring elements of ToM for 
comprehension. Why might metaphorical language be special? Recent research suggests 
metaphor is more strongly felt (or embodied) than literal language.  Ritchie (2006, p.117) 
explains that environment is rich with information and we have many schemas (e.g. 
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conversation context, relationship to the speaker, etc.) that inform our knowledge of the 
world. However, we are often not conscious of these schemata and have no need to 
perform much cognitive or embodied work at any given time to understand what is 
happening. Applying this perspective to language, Ritchie (2006) explains attention can 
be captured by certain salient aspects of communication. He suggests metaphor is one of 
the experiences in communication that, where relevant, can capture the reader’s attention 
and prompt elaborate cognitive and inferential work. Gibbs and Colston (2012) 
additionally suggest that metaphor carries an ostensive message that demands attention in 
a way that literal language does not and processing is, in part, based on the 
comprehender’s willingness to make sense of what is said. According to these researchers 
(Ritchie, 2006; Gibbs & Colston, 2012) the result of this attentional capture is a requisite 
embodied simulation of the content of the sentence and why it was said. 
The result of attending to metaphor is an emotive and cognitive experience of the 
content that is more powerful than a literal approximation (e.g., Ortony, 1975). As the 
first studies in this dissertation showed, contexts associated with metaphor included 
cognitive and emotional content that was social. The social inferences associated with 
metaphor production are extended to the reading comprehension tasks in this chapter. 
Readers likely engage an “as if” simulation to embody the content of the metaphorical 
message and the intention of the speaker (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Metaphor may 
therefore be perceived as expressing emotional and interpersonal content because it is 
strongly embodied and allows the reader to infer a range of intention and emotion (Gibbs 
& Colston, 2012; Mar et al., 2006). 
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Given that the social and emotional inferences associated with metaphor may be 
more strongly felt (or embodied) compared to literal language, two broad predictions 
follow. First, I predict participants will perceive greater closeness and emotionality in 
metaphorical compared to literal statements (gauged by likert type ratings). This 
interpersonal information will not be explicitly marked anywhere in the text. If the 
predictions are confirmed, social and emotional inferences should emerge from an 
interpretation of the use of metaphor. Such findings will be congruent with Horton 
(2007), who showed that interlocutors (whose relationship in the text was ambiguous) are 
perceived as better friends when metaphor is employed. The second prediction extends 
Horton’s (2007) findings by considering the relation of scores on the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes task to the emotional and social ratings that the participants provide. I predict 
that participants who perceive greater closeness and emotionality when characters speak 
metaphorically will also be more accurate at identifying emotions in sets of eyes. This 
correlation will show that the inferences associated with metaphor are associated with 
general social processes like ToM. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 undergraduate students (23 Females) from Western 
University with English as a first language (Mean Age = 19.37, SD= 2.80). Participants 
received 1 research credit for completing the study. Ethical approval for both experiments 
in this chapter is presented in Appendix F. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Materials were short scenarios created by the researcher. In the studies presented 
in this chapter, Cardillo et al.’s (2010) norms were not used because those stimuli do not 
fit easily into a conversational exchange without having to provide participants with a 
considerable amount of preceding context. Additionally, using Cardillo’s (2010) stimuli 
would mean each metaphorical and literal stimulus would be presented in a different 
context that varies on the factors discussed in the previous chapter or even other factors 
that have not been considered. Although the results of the first two studies may be more 
ecologically valid, presenting readers with stimuli using that type of context may cause a 
loss of experimental control. Therefore, the next studies were intended to balance these 
concerns and show metaphor’s social effects with different, more constrained contexts.  
As a pretest, a separate set of 24 participants provided ratings on the metaphorical and 
literal comments out of context. They rated these sentences on exaggeration, emotional 
intensity and familiarity (using 1-5 Likert type scales). The final stimulus set consisted of 
eight metaphorical and eight literal statements matched on these variables (see Table 6 
for mean ratings). 
The eight metaphorical and eight literal phrases were each placed in an 
interpersonal context involving two friends. Two versions for each context were created. 
One scenario ended metaphorically and the other context ended literally. These contexts 
had two friends interacting with one another and ended with an interlocutor commenting 
about the situation with a literal or metaphorical statement (see Appendix G for  
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Table 6 
Mean ratings for stimuli used in Studies 3 and 4 based on participants’ ratings (with 
standard deviations in brackets) 
 Familiarity Emotionality Exaggeration 
Metaphor 3.58 (.85) 3.24 (.70) 2.79 (.80) 
Literal 3.30 (.85) 3.02 (.50) 2.50 (.70) 
N for each comparison = 16 
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examples).  Participants saw only one version of each scenario (the language 
manipulation constituted a within subjects design). Eight filler scenarios were also 
created which consisted of a description of two friends who shared an experience but did 
not speak directly to one another. Filler scenarios were not included in any reported 
analysis but were simply used to ensure the participants did not develop strategies when 
providing ratings in the literal or metaphorical contexts. 
Participants answered five questions, three of which assessed their perception of 
the interlocutors in the text and two assessing their own experience of the text. Text-level 
questions were designed to tap into ToM processes because they require the participant to 
recognize thoughts and emotions in others (Call & Tomasello, 1999). The three text-level 
questions (inspired by the work of Gibbs, Leggitt & Turner, 2002 and Horton, 2007) 
include the degree of perceived emotional intensity, closeness of the speakers and the 
degree the friend of the speaker could relate to the speaker’s experience. “Relate to” was 
defined as follows: Sometimes when we read stories we find we can relate to a person’s 
thoughts and emotions. This means we feel empathy for that person. Empathy is the 
ability to identify certain feelings in someone and to share these individual’s experiences. 
The remaining two questions assessed the experience of the participant while 
reading the text (reader-level questions). Reader-level questions tap into metacognition or 
the ability to think about one’s own thoughts. Metacognition is related to ToM (see e.g., 
Flavell, 2000). The participants were also asked if they could relate to the speaker (using 
the same criteria of “empathy” as described above) and if the speaker might be like 
someone they know.  
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At the outset of the study participants were not made aware of the nature of the 
Eyes task. Instead, participants were told they were going to be completing a few 
different tasks and that each would be explained in turn. Using a within subject 
manipulation, participants first read short stories that ended with literal or metaphorical 
comments. Following each story, participants answered the text-level and reader-level 
questions. They then completed the Eyes task.  The study took approximately 45 minutes 
to complete. 
Results 
The first set of analyses examines ratings on the five questions that assess social 
and emotional inferences of the text (On 1-5 Likert type scales). The intercorrelations 
among the five questions between the different conditions are presented in Table 7. 
Additionally, intercorrelations among the five questions in metaphor and literal condition 
are presented in Table 8and 9. Separate repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for 
each of the five questions, with the target language type (metaphor or literal) as the 
independant variable. The following effects were observed. Participants perceived the 
characters’ experiences as significantly more emotionally intense when those speakers 
used a metaphorical (M = 3.80, SD = .67) instead of a literal statement (M = 3.63, SD = 
.60), F(1,39) = 5.39, p = .02.  Moreover, the friends in the story were rated as 
significantly closer when they used a metaphorical (M = 3.70, SD = .42) compared to a 
literal statement (M = 3.56, SD = .48), p = .01, F(1,39) = 6.17, p = .02.  None of the other 
contrasts reached significance. 
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Table 7 
Intercorrelations between questions in literal and metaphorical conditions for Study 3 
   Literal   
Metaphor Emotion Characters 
relate to 
Closeness Reader 
Relates to  
Like a friend 
Emotion .74* .40 .52* .19 .30 
Characters 
relate to 
.32 .82* .20 .46 .37 
Closeness .51* .19 .70* .35 .26 
Reader 
Relates to  
.40 .34 .15 .62* .36 
Like a friend .33 .27 .09 .51* .60* 
*Significant at the .002 level using a Bonferroni correction 
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Table 8 
Intercorrelations between questions in the metaphor condition in Study 3 
                                                Text level                                       Reader level 
 Emotion Characters 
Relate to 
Closeness Readers 
Relate to  
Like a friend 
Emotion  .37** .54* .45* .46* 
Characters 
Relate to 
  .13 .39** .34 
Closeness    .22 .32 
Readers 
Relate to 
    .76* 
*Significant at the .005 level using a Bonferroni correction 
**borderline at <.025 
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Table 9 
Intercorrelations between questions in the literal condition in Study 3 
                                                Text level                                       Reader level 
 Emotion Characters 
Relate to 
Closeness Readers 
Relate to  
Like a friend 
Emotion  .46** .46* .38** .32 
Characters 
Relate to 
  .33 .46* .33 
Closeness    .16 .11 
Readers 
Relate to 
    .53* 
*Significant at the .005 level using a Bonferroni correction 
**borderline at <.025 
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The second set of analyses assesses the correlation between the questions the 
participants answered and their scores on the Eyes task. Because emotional intensity and 
closeness ratings were significantly higher for metaphorical than literal conditions, 
ratings on these scales were correlated with the participants’ Eyes score. Higher scores on 
the Eyes task were significantly correlated with ratings of greater perceived closeness 
when friends used metaphor, r(38) = .34, p = .03 but not when the friends spoke literally, 
r(38) = .14, p = .36. Given that the metaphorical and literal ratings of closeness were 
highly correlated, r(38) = .70, p = .001, the unique contribution of the Eyes score to the 
closeness ratings was assessed using a partial correlation to control for the variance 
contributed by literal statements. Closeness ratings significantly correlated with the Eyes 
scores, in the expected direction r(37) = .34, p = .03, controlling for the contribution from 
the literal condition. When the reverse is computed, the correlation of the literal ratings 
with the Eyes score, controlling for the contribution of metaphorical language, I find no 
significant relation r(37) = -.14, p = .38. Emotional intensity ratings did not correlate with 
the Eyes score in metaphorical, r(38) = .23, p = .14
7
 or literal, r(38) =.12, p = .42 
conditions. 
The remaining text-level question did not show a significant difference. One 
friend did not relate to the other to a greater degree in the metaphor condition (M = 2.95, 
SD =.59) relative to the literal condition (M = 2.95, SD= .58). Similarly, the two reader-
level questions did not show differences based on target type. Participants did not relate 
to the speaker’s experience to a greater degree with the metaphorical comments (M = 
3.19, SD =.61) compared to the literal comments (M = 3.11, SD = .57). Likewise, 
                                                          
7
 Note the correlation in the metaphor condition is in the predicted direction. 
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participants did not feel as though the interlocutor using metaphor (M = 3.48, SD = .71) 
would be more like someone they knew relative to a character who spoke literally (M = 
3.46, SD = .61). 
Discussion 
 This study was run to test readers’ social inferences of metaphor in text and how 
these inferences relate to social intelligence as indexed by the Eyes task. The study also 
serves as an extension to Horton’s (2007) study that showed participants perceived 
strangers as closer when one interlocutor commented metaphorically on an event. As 
predicted, the present study showed that, even when participants are told the interlocutors 
are friends, greater closeness is inferred when an interlocutor uses a metaphor. The 
present study was run with, arguably, better controlled stimuli than those used in previous 
studies
8
, further validating the social effects of metaphor. In addition to perceived 
closeness, the study also assessed perceived emotional intensity as well as the reader’s 
own experience with the text (e.g., metacognition).  The results show that metaphor was 
perceived as significantly more emotionally intense than literal language. Taken together, 
the results suggest the social effects of metaphor include both a greater perceived 
closeness between interlocutors and greater emotional intensity of the comment 
compared to a literal equivalent. 
After reading the short vignettes and answering the questions, participants also 
completed the Eyes task. This task was included to determine whether the perception of 
emotional intensity and closeness in the metaphor condition is associated with general 
                                                          
8
 Neither Gibbs, Leggitt and Turner nor Horton present norms or indicate their stimuli were normed 
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social intelligence.  As predicted, scores on the Eyes task significantly (and uniquely) 
correlated with ratings of closeness between speakers using metaphor. The correlation 
suggests that those who infer a close relationship in the characters using metaphor, also 
show greater social intelligence, as indexed by the ability to identify emotions in sets of 
eyes. The results are supportive of the idea that metaphor conveys interpersonal 
information to readers; especially to those who are socially astute. 
Outside of the work presented in this dissertation, no research has investigated the 
relation of first order ToM to metaphor perception in an adult population, underscoring 
the novel contribution of the correlational findings with the Eyes task. Additionally, the 
reading comprehension findings shown here can be interpreted in light of research from 
the first two studies of this dissertation, that show ToM is activated when participants 
create contexts associated with metaphor. In the present study, readers infer emotional 
and social content in metaphor use and, arguably, activate social-cognitive processes to 
do so.  
No differences were found with the reader-level questions. These questions, it 
seemed, did not engage ToM or metacognitive processes as strongly as questions about 
the personal relationship between the characters. Generally speaking, it is possible that 
readers do not consciously think about if they can relate to the character or whether the 
character was like one of their friends. Therefore, unlike the text level questions, these 
questions may have seemed artificial or even difficult to estimate. Additionally, the 
comment in the text was not directed at the reader thus slightly reducing their own 
empathetic engagement. Alternately, it is possible that readers did not feel like they could 
relate to the content because the texts were not sufficiently elaborate. Although all 
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questions are used in the next study (to keep the methodology consistent), the analytical 
emphasis is on text-based questions.  
Study 4 
 To further investigate the nature of interpersonal effects in the perception of 
metaphor, the same study was run using a between groups design. The motivation to do 
so comes from the fact that switching between literal and non-literal language may 
attenuate the effects of non-literal language. A between groups design will provide more 
straightforward correlations between the Eyes task and the variables of interest. 
Additionally, between group methodology is more consistent with the design of the first 
two studies in this dissertation.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-two participants (59 females, Mean age: 20.10 SD: 5.80) from Western 
University completed the study (46 in each group). Participants were randomly placed 
either in a metaphorical or literal group and answered the same questions used in the first 
study of this chapter. They also completed the Eyes task. 
Procedure 
Stimuli and methods were the same as Study 3, with the removal of filler items 
and the use of between groups design. Once again, at the outset of the study participants 
are not made aware of the nature of the Eyes task. Instead, participants were told they are 
going to complete a few different tasks and that each will be explained in turn. 
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Results and Discussion 
For intercorrelations among the five questions for each group, see Tables 10 and 
11. Once again, metaphorical comments were rated as significantly more emotionally 
intense ( M = 3.79, SD = .44), compared to literal comments (M = 3.43, SD = .43), t(90) 
3.88,  p = .001. Additionally, interlocutors were rated as interpersonally closer to one 
another when using metaphor (M = 3.52, SD = .33) compared to literal comments (M = 
3.35, SD =.38), t(90) = 2.07, p = .04. These findings replicate the results from the 
previous study in this chapter and Horton (2007).  Participants also indicated that one 
character could relate to another to a greater degree when the conversation involved 
metaphorical (M = 2.93, SD = .45) compared to literal dialogue (M= 2.77, SD = .39), 
although the contrast only approached significance, t(90) = 1.84, p =.06. Scores on the 
Eyes task correlated moderately with ratings on emotional intensity in the metaphorical 
group r(44) = .35, p = .02 but not the literal group r(44) = .03, p = .88. 
Once again the reader-level contrasts failed to reach significance, but this time 
were, more obviously, in the predicted direction. The participants tended to indicate that 
they could relate to the comment to a greater degree with metaphorical (M= 3.30, SD = 
.52) rather than literal interactions (M = 3.11, SD = .62), t(90) = 1.56, p = .12. 
Participants tended to think that the interlocutor speaking metaphorically (M = 3.64, SD = 
.53) would be more like a friend they would have compared to those speaking literally (M 
= 3.43, SD = .64), t(90) =1.66, p = .10.  
A step-wise regression for the metaphor condition was run with the five questions 
as predictors of the Eyes task. Analysis show that emotion ratings added independent  
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Table 10 
Intercorrelations between questions in the metaphor group in Study 4 
                                                Text level                                       Reader level 
 Emotion Characters 
Relate to 
Closeness Readers 
Relate to  
Like a friend 
Emotion  .30 .37** .35** .10 
Characters 
Relate to 
  .35** .54* .34** 
Closeness    .25 -.07 
Readers 
Relate to 
    .65* 
*Significant at the .005 level using a Bonferroni correction 
**borderline at <.025 
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Table 11  
Intercorrelations on between questions in the literal group in Study 4 
                                             Text level                                       Reader level 
 Emotion Characters 
Relate to 
Closeness Readers 
Relate to  
Like a friend 
Emotion  .25 .41* .30 .15 
Characters 
Relate to 
  .26 .19 .08 
Closeness    .11 .10 
Readers 
Relate to 
    .73* 
*Significant at the .005 level using a Bonferroni correction 
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significant predictability to the Eyes task, R = .35, β = .35, F(1,44)= 6.18, p = .02. These 
results are congruent with the correlational analyses reported above. The regression 
model for the literal group showed no significant predictors, R = .16 and therefore a 
stepwise regression was not run. 
Using a between subjects methodology, this study confirms the findings of the 
first study of this chapter. That is, metaphorical comments are perceived as emotionally 
intense and that the two speakers are close. Additionally, the results show that use of 
metaphor is perceived as prompting one character to more strongly relate to another 
compared to the literal condition (although this result is borderline). Eyes scores 
correlated with emotional intensity ratings, suggesting that those who show greater social 
intelligence are more perceptive to the social information conveyed by metaphorical 
comments. This study furthers the idea that inferences about why someone might use 
metaphor rely on general social abilities like ToM. The significance of the finding and 
the difference between the two studies are discussed in the following general discussion. 
General Discussion for Studies 3 and 4 
 Recall the purpose of the two studies presented in this chapter was to assess what 
readers infer from metaphorical and literal expressions used by friends. The findings 
from these studies extend the research in the first chapter that assessed what writers 
included in the creation of a metaphorical context. Results from the two studies in the 
previous chapter, showed that writers included social elements in the creation of 
metaphorical context. The findings of those production studies were interpreted in light 
of an ostensive reader. In the studies presented in this chapter, participants are placed in 
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the role of the reader. In this case contextual information was matched to isolate the 
effects of metaphor use between interlocutors in text. 
Results of the two studies in this chapter show that the use of metaphor between 
the two interlocutors was enough to suggest that, generally speaking, the comment itself 
was emotionally intense, that the two friends were close and that one friend could relate 
to the other (although this last contrast was only a marginal effect in Study 4). 
Additionally, participants who perceived greater emotional intensity and closeness were 
more accurate at identifying emotions in others (as determined by scores on the Eyes 
task), suggesting that those who show greater social intelligence are more perceptive to 
the social information conveyed by metaphorical comments. In contrast, literal ratings 
did not correlate with scores on the Eyes task in either study, suggesting this type of 
language may not require the same social inferences.  The results of both studies suggest 
that the inferences associated with metaphor generally emerge when the reader is 
considering a character’s perspective and not necessarily their own personal experience 
with the text. Taken together, these results support the contention that metaphor conveys 
social and emotional information.  
The finding of higher ratings on social variables implies that use of metaphor in 
text can prompt a social-inferential process on the part of the reader. The correlations 
between the Eyes task and interpersonal variables suggest these social-inferential 
processes engage ToM. The correlational findings can be interpreted in light of previous 
research the shows readers infer pragmatic and social information from even short pieces 
of text (e.g., Horton, 2007). These inferences help create meaningful construals of what is 
happening in the story (Gibbs, 2006). Therefore, the relationship between social ratings 
92 
 
 
 
and the Eyes tasks in the metaphor condition suggests reading metaphor engages an “as 
if” simulation wherein interlocutors take others’ perspectives to infer intention and 
emotional closeness (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Moreover, metaphor uniquely engages this 
inferential process, given that no relationship was found between ratings and scores on 
the Eyes task in the literal condition (Study 3) or group (Study 4).  
 There was one noticeable difference between the findings of the two studies. Two 
different (but complementary) correlations emerge from Studies 3 and 4. Study 3 
demonstrated a strong positive correlation between ratings on how close the friends are 
perceived and scores on the Eyes task. Study 4 shows a correlation with those same 
variables in the correct direction, but was not reliable (r(44) = .14, p = .35). Instead the 
Eyes scores significantly correlated with ratings of emotional intensity in the Study 4. To 
investigate the contribution of emotionality ratings to the closeness correlation, a partial 
correlation was conducted. The partial correlation of closeness and Eyes scores, 
controlling for the influence of emotional intensity ratings, shows no significant relation 
(r(41) = .01, p = .99). Therefore closeness ratings did not contribute to Eyes scores in 
Study 4.  
Given that closeness and emotionality ratings are generally highly correlated with 
each other in these studies, the different significant correlations in the two studies are best 
seen as complementary. Research on interpersonal relationships show strong friendships 
are a combination of emotional intensity and closeness (Marsden & Campbell, 1984). 
These concepts are separate but interactive. Therefore, closeness and emotionality 
questions likely tapped into a similar underlying experience. Indeed, the intercorrelation 
matrices from both studies suggest the three text level questions are highly correlated 
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with each other. Another possible explanation is based on the observation that closeness 
ratings by the metaphor group in the second study tended to be lower (M = 3.52) than the 
ratings in the first study (M = 3.70)
9
. The lower ratings suggest that the between groups 
design reduced the perceived closeness of the two characters but retained the emotional 
intensity. The mean for emotional intensity was consistent across the two studies; 3.79 in 
Study 1 and 3.80 in Study 2. 
The findings are congruent with the idea that we simulate emotive and social 
information when we make inferences about the reason metaphor is used. I do not argue 
here that literal language is not (or cannot) show an “as if” simulation of others’ thoughts. 
Instead I take a position similar to Gibbs and Colston (2012, p. 217), who suggest that 
metaphor carries an ostensive message that demands attention in a way that literal 
language does not. In this case, comprehension “may generally function along the lines 
suggested by Relevance Theory, but with the addition of embodied simulation 
processes”.  According to Relevance Theory, the ostensive message is worthy of the 
processing efforts on the part of the comprehender. Given its non-literal nature, metaphor 
comprehension always proceeds with an interpretation of the ostensive message. During 
the interpretative process, extralinguistic information is rapidly sought and applied 
(Ritchie, 2006; Katz, 2005). Moreover, Gibbs (2006) indicates that readers may only 
construct embodied simulation when “those inferences enable them to understand the plot 
or the writer’s rationale for including something in the text” (p. 207). The research 
presented in this chapter suggests that relevant contextual information includes 
knowledge of others’ cognitive and emotional states. As a consequence, the interpersonal 
                                                          
9
 This contrast is significantly different; t(84)=2.07, p = .04 
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inferences associated with metaphor may be more strongly simulated (or embodied) 
when reading text. 
 More broadly, the results inform reading studies in general. In order to understand 
text, readers infer content beyond the words on the page. The correlation between 
metaphor ratings and scores on the Eyes task suggest these inferences include emotional 
and social experiences. The findings in the two studies presented here are largely 
supportive, albeit indirectly, of the idea that we embody emotional and social information 
in text (see e.g., Zwann, 1999). Likewise, the studies provide some support to the idea 
that pretense can convey interpersonal information (e.g., Gallese, 2007). Importantly, 
these embodied experiences of text may be more apparent with metaphorical than literal 
language. 
The two reading studies are a logical extension to the findings of the context 
production studies of the second chapter. The production studies showed that participants 
were more conscious of their audience when prompted by metaphorical, but not literal 
statements. Participants in these first studies included emotional and expressive content in 
metaphorical contexts in order to make a context meaningful. The reading studies in this 
chapter show that indeed, closeness and emotionality are inferred when reading metaphor 
in extended text, even when contexts are written so that they are less imaginatively rich 
and emotionally powerful. 
 The next chapter explores reader’s inferential judgments using reaction time 
methodology. To do so, all contextual information is removed and participants are, in 
essence, forced to rely solely on inferences about the sentences that are reading. The 
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general research question here is: what are the associated creative and social inferences 
when doing so?  
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Chapter Four 
 The studies presented thus far have assessed the production and perception of 
metaphor using contextual information. These studies show that the effects of metaphor 
production and comprehension are emotional and interpersonal in nature. Studies 1 and 2 
show participants included social and emotional markers that help express content of 
thought to others when asked to created context for metaphorical sentences. Studies 3 and 
4 show that participants inferred closeness and emotional intensity when metaphor was 
used between friends in written text. To further the social hypothesis of metaphor, the 
final study investigates the inferences associated with metaphor by removing contextual 
information. Specifically, this study assesses Katz’s (2005, p. 185) claim “even when 
presumably out of context, the interpretation of a given statement is inextricably linked to 
the manner in which it is presented, and when an explicit context is not available, one is 
constructed during the act of comprehension”. To test this premise, metaphor is presented 
on its own, unconstrained by context. The intention here is to assess the strength and 
versatility of social effects, under contextually vague circumstances where participants 
must strongly rely on their own inferences for comprehension. The relevant inferences 
are predicted to be largely social in nature.  
Recall metaphor perception likely involves an inferential process that incorporates 
a host of factors including knowledge of the speaker’s intent and the emotion (e.g., 
Ortony, 1975). As a consequence, information conveyed by metaphorical language 
requires social inferences in addition to lexical and semantic knowledge. I posit that the 
reader may ask, at some level, “why would that be said” or “what is the context” even if a 
speaker is not present (see e.g., Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006) and even if these thoughts are 
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not conscious. Indeed, Ritchie (2006) provides a theoretical reason why this might occur. 
He proposed that metaphor comprehension requires introspective knowledge that 
provides information on emotional valence and social or contextual norms. Indeed, one 
could argue that important introspective inferences likely include, at a minimum, the 
intention that motivates use of a given non-literal expression. Gibbs and Colston (2012) 
expand on Ritchie’s (2006) work, suggesting that metaphor generally invites perspective 
taking in a more significant way than literal language. Consequently, metaphor relies on 
both imaginative and inferential leaps into other “minds and worlds” (Gibbs & Colston, 
2012, p. 218). Even under increasingly vague contexts, participants infer human intention 
to interpret metaphor (e.g., producing more interpretations when a metaphor is associated 
with a poet as opposed to a computer program; Gibbs, Kushner & Mills, 1991). 
As a result of these imaginal and inferential processes, it is possible to look at the 
consequences of reading metaphors by once again using other, ostensibly unrelated, 
cognitive and emotional tasks. Recall, the basic premise of embodied cognition assumes 
whatever relevant information is simulated in one task can implicitly influence other 
tasks. The study in this chapter was designed to address the social consequences of 
reading metaphors without an elaborative context and is meant as a final extension of the 
other studies of this dissertation. The previous studies had participants either create 
context for metaphor or read metaphor with contextualizing information and answer 
questions on this information. The study in this chapter removes context and questions 
that orient the reader to relevant social information (as in studies 3 and 4). This last study 
is meant to examine whether social inferences are involved in interpretation even when 
reading metaphor out of context. 
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The first prediction is that reading metaphor outside of contextualizing 
information will still prompt an orientation to social information. This premise is tested in 
several different ways. The first way is the inclusion of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
task. Recall that the Eyes task requires one to identify the relevant mental/emotional 
states depicted in pictures of Eyes (what is called first order Theory of mind; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). Studies in this dissertation show that metaphor processing activates 
first order ToM (as assessed with the Eyes task). I examine here whether the effects of 
reading a metaphor without context “spills over” to other social tasks, indexed by 
performance on the Eyes task that follows the metaphor reading task. Specifically, I 
predict participants will show higher scores on the Eyes task even in the absence of 
elaborative context (a prediction that would complement group differences findings in 
Study 2 of this dissertation that showed participants scored higher on the Eyes task 
following production of contextual information associated with metaphor).  
A secondary way of examining whether metaphor induces orientation to social 
information is to examine the content of the responses on a different, non-social task. A 
noun generation task is used in this study. In this task, participants are presented with 
verbs (e.g. “running”) and are asked to write the first noun that comes to mind (e.g., 
“person” or “legs”). Responses to the noun generation task will thus be analyzed using 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001). 
Responses are predicted to vary depending on the perspectives of the respondent. The 
critical contrast is whether the mere act of reading a metaphor induces a social 
orientation, as seen by the generation of words that focus on a human agent as opposed 
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to, say, an object or body part. This orientation is captured by the “social” category of 
LIWC, which includes words like “mother”, “father”, “doctor” etc.   
Recall from earlier discussion that LIWC’s social category shows mixed results in 
the literature when used in extended discourse contexts (e.g., Pressman & Cohen, 2006). 
Indeed, the first study of this dissertation shows that the literal group tended to use more 
words from the social category when describing actions in a short discourse context. In 
the final study of this dissertation, the social category may actually inform the nature of 
metaphorical thought because of the constrained methodology. Unlike Studies 1 and 2 of 
this dissertation, participants in the present study are not creating discourse contexts, but 
simply providing “the first noun that comes to mind” in response to verb prompts. The 
first thing that comes to mind upon reading metaphor is, arguably, human intention. This 
embodied experience of human intention is predicted to “spill over” to the noun 
generation
10
. Under the constrained methodology of the noun-generation task, I predict 
participants in the metaphor group will respond with more social words than those in the 
literal group.  
Another potential effect of metaphor will also be assessed. Some researchers have 
suggested that metaphor has “creative” effects. Creativity here is the cognitive process 
that involves “forming […] elements into new combinations which either meet specific 
requirements or are somehow useful” (Mednick, 1962, p. 221). Creativity is therefore 
relevant to metaphor comprehension because metaphor requires the “construction of 
novel, non-salient connections or associations between words in order to integrate 
                                                          
10
 Other LIWC categories are not predicted to be relevant in this type of study. For instance, in response to 
the word “hugging”, it is unlikely that participants will use an affect word (happy)  or a cognitive word 
(think) because these words violate subject-verb agreement rules of the English language.  
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meaning and create plausible expressions” (Gold, Faust & Ben-Artzi, 2011, p. 604). The 
act of understanding metaphor may encourage participants to deploy attention widely to 
access remote lexical and conceptual cognition (see e.g., Katz & Pestell, 1989). For 
instance, researchers suggest that those sensitive to metaphorical meaning will be better 
at connecting semantically distant objects (via a task like the remote associates test). In 
fact participants with higher remote associates’ scores are significantly faster at 
identifying the meaning of novel metaphors (Gold, Faust & Ben-Artzi, 2011).The 
creative effects of metaphor, however, are largely understudied. 
The noun generation task can also be used as a proxy for creativity. Semantic 
distance between verb and noun will be calculated using latent semantic analysis (LSA, 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997). This methodology is considered a sensitive test of the type of 
creativity defined above (e.g., Prabhakaren, Green, & Gray, 2011). Latent semantic 
analysis calculates the frequency of co-occurrence of terms using corpora data and 
produces a cosine of the words of comparison. The word-word distances produced by 
LSA tend to correlate with word-word priming effects (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997) 
and are therefore a good approximation of semantic association. Distance between a noun 
and a verb can be a sign of creativity because greater semantic distances suggest more 
remote association. For instance, one study had participants produce a verb under a 
condition in which they were prompted to “be creative” or not prompted (Prabhakaren, 
Green, & Gray, 2011). Participants in the “creative” condition produced noun-verb pairs 
with distances were significantly further away than participants who were not prompted. 
Latent semantic analysis is therefore an appropriate test of creativity prompted by 
metaphorical thought. 
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The general procedure for this experiment is as follows. Following the format of 
many studies in this dissertation, participants in Study 5 were placed randomly in two 
groups and either read short metaphorical or short literal sentences (taken from Cardillo 
et al., 2010 norms). They occasionally answered “yes” or “no” questions to ensure they 
were paying attention. In the stimuli used here, the single word that drove metaphorical 
or literal interpretation always came at the end of the sentence (e.g., The skater’s fall was 
a stumble vs. The first date was a stumble). These stimuli were, of course, matched on 
relevant LIWC variables (discussed in greater detail in the methods section). Unlike the 
other studies in this dissertation, this reading task requires participants to read each 
sentence word-by-word via a moving windows procedure. The procedure permits the 
analysis of “wrap up effects” (Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 2000) or the time spent 
synthesizing the information in the sentence. Wrap up effects are indexed by time spent 
on the last word of the sentence. Longer wrap up times suggest integration of lexical and 
pragmatic information. Research has consistently shown that metaphor out of context 
takes significantly longer when compared to literal statements out of context or metaphor 
within context (e.g., Inhoff, Lima & Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert & Reynolds, 1978; 
Kemper, 1981).  Following word-by-word reading, participants completed the noun-
generation task and the Eyes task (counterbalanced). 
Summary and Predictions 
Based on the embodied view of metaphor comprehension, I predict participants 
will do better on the Eyes task after reading metaphorical sentences compared to those 
who read literal sentences. Likewise, the metaphor group will use more social words in 
their responses to the noun generation task compared to the literal group. Finally, the 
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semantic distances of verb-noun generation will be assessed, with the prediction that 
metaphor should prompt broad attentional deployment to remote concepts. 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-nine undergraduate students (25 Females) from Western University with 
English as a first language (Mean Age = 18.56, SD = 1.80) were tested. Two participants 
were removed from the study, one for showing reaction times longer than 2 standard 
deviations above the mean and one for failing to complete all parts of the study. 
Participants received 1 research credit for completing the study. Participants were 
randomly placed in a metaphor (n = 20) or literal group (n = 19). Ethical approval is 
presented in Appendix H. 
Materials and Procedure 
 At the outset of the study participants were not made aware of the nature of the 
Eyes task or the noun generation task. Instead participants were told they will be 
completing a few different tasks and each will be explained in turn. The methodology is 
congruent with much of the work on embodied cognition wherein participants complete 
ostensibly unrelated tasks. 
Materials were 58 metaphorical and literal statements taken from the Cardillo et 
al’s (2010) norms (see Appendix I for examples). Items were chosen so that the last word 
of the sentences was the same between the two groups (e.g., metaphorical: “The contract 
was legal zigzag”; literal: “The mountain road was a zigzag”). These items were matched 
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on emotional valence as determined by the proportion of people who rated the comment 
as positive (Metaphor M = .27 SD = .31; Literal M = .26, SD =.28 t(114) = .10, p =.91). 
Additionally, sentences were analyzed with LIWC and matched on pronouns, affect, 
social, motion and cognitive mechanism words (see Table 12). These short sentences 
were presented on a computer screen using E-prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). Participants read the sentences word-by-word and occasionally 
answered some comprehension questions (14 in total) about the sentences they had read 
to ensure they were paying attention.  
Following the reading task, participants completed the “Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes task” (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) and the noun generation task (counterbalanced 
across participants). The noun generation task, akin to verb generation tasks (e.g., 
Holland et al., 2001), requires participants to produce a noun for a give action (e.g., 
hugging). Participants are asked to provide the first noun that comes to mind for 30 verbs 
presented one at a time on the computer screen. Half of the verbs were taken from the 
sentences the participants read and half were new verbs. Old and new verbs were used so 
participants would not consciously recognize the words or develop strategies when 
responding. Furthermore, the use of old and new verbs permits an analysis of where 
social and creative effects might occur (e.g., if effects are seen with old items or if they 
transfer to new items). These different types of verbs are therefore included in the 
reported analyses. 
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Table 12 
 LIWC norms for stimuli used in Study 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Metaphor Literal 
All Pronouns 2.80 (6.26) 2.50 (6.71) 
Personal Pronoun 2.80 (6.26) 2.25 (5.70) 
She/He pronouns 2.30 (6.26) 2.25 (5.70) 
Adverbs 0.24 (1.89) 1.40 (4.73) 
Affect 5.73 (9.16) 6.79 (9.27) 
Cognitive mechanisms 2.88 (7.05) 1.13 (5.23) 
Motion 2.46 (5.64) 4.45 (8.39) 
Social 5.91 (7.93) 4.26 (9.08) 
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Results 
Manipulation Check 
Two sentences with reaction times two standard deviations longer than the 
average were removed from the analysis. Sentences to which participants provided 
incorrect answers were removed from the analysis (less than 1% of the data). Confirming 
past research involving the reading of metaphors out-of-context (e.g., Inhoff, Lima, & 
Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Shallert & Reynolds, 1978), participants tended to spend longer at 
the last word of the metaphorical sentences. This was found across items (Mmet = 900.00 
ms, SD = 128.30; Mlit= 767.01 ms,  SD = 102.48, t(110) = 6.08, p = .001) and 
participants (Mmet= 900.30 ms, SD = 199.27; Mlit= 767.01 ms, SD = 228.31, t(37) = 
1.94, p <.06). 
Eyes Task 
As predicted, and supporting the group differences findings in Study 2 of this 
dissertation, participants in the metaphor group did significantly better on the Eyes task 
(M = 29.60, SD = 2.16) than those in the literal group (M = 25.80, SD = 3.50), t(37) = 
4.04, p = .001. Performance on the Eyes task did not correlate with average RTs to the 
last word with either the metaphorical r(18) = .16, p = .48 or literal sentences, r(17) = .10, 
p = .66. 
Noun-generation Task 
The nouns generated for each of 30 verbs were analyzed with the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word count program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001), which 
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provides counts on a variety of categories of words. The data presented here are average 
word counts with a maximum of about 30 responses per participant.  Analysis focused on 
the production of words from the “social” category, though for completeness a range of 
categories was assessed. The group who had read the metaphors prior to doing the noun 
generation task produced significantly more social words (e.g.,  “friend”, “mother”, when 
given a verb such as “hugging”), M = 7.25 (SD = 4.00), than the group who read the 
literal sentences prior to the task, M = 4.62 (SD = 2.60), t(37) = 2.41, p = .02. For the 
social nouns produced in the metaphor group, paired t-tests show responses did not differ 
when participants were prompted with old verbs (M = 3.55, SD= 1.90) or new verbs (M= 
3.70, SD= 2.45), t(19) = -.36, p = .72.  For social nouns produced by the literal group, 
paired t-tests showed no differences when participants were prompted with old (M = 
2.57, SD = 1.38) or new (M = 2.05, SD = 1.47) verbs, t(19) = -1.94, p = .07.  
The literal group produced significantly more biological words (e.g., “hand”, to 
the same verbs), M = 3.90, SD = 1.50, compared to the metaphorical group, M = 2.40, SD 
= 1.60, t(37) = -2.64, p = .02. There were no reliable differences in the generation of 
biological nouns when prompted with old (1.89, SD = 1.04) or new (M = 2.05, SD =  
1.26) verbs, t(18) = -.38, p = .70. Likewise, the metaphor group did not differ on the 
production of biological related word in the old (M =.95, SD = .82) or new (M = 1.45, SD 
= 1.14) conditions, although the effect approached significance; t(18) = 1.95, p = .07. 
Creativity Effects 
Average distance between noun and verb was computed for each participant using 
LSA cosines. Numbers closer to 1 indicate close semantic relations between words. 
Recall that, if metaphor prompts a creative thought process, the average distance should 
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be significantly further away from 1 compared to a literal group. The average semantic 
distance between metaphor and literal groups did not differ; metaphor (M = .24, SD = 
.04), literal (M = .25, SD = .03), t(37) = -.83, p = .41. The average semantic distance did 
not differ between old and in verbs in either the metaphor or the literal group. For the 
metaphor group, the average distance for old verbs was .23 (SD= .05) and .25 (SD= .05) 
for new verbs, t(38) = 1.04, p =.31. For the literal group, the average distance for old 
verbs was .25 (SD= .04) and .26 (SD= .05) for new verbs, t(36) = .84, p =.40. Reading 
metaphor did not result in the greater deployment of attention reflected in more remote 
associates.   
To be complete, I investigated the relationship between creativity (as indexed by 
LSA) and scores on the Eyes task. Semantic distances did not correlate with scores on the 
Eyes task in either the metaphor r (18)= .11, p = .64 or literal condition r (17) = .24, p 
=.30. 
Discussion 
 Study 5 was run to test the implicit impact of reading metaphors without specific 
contextual information. Specifically, Study 5 tested the idea that even out of context, 
metaphor comprehension is accomplished through inferences about intentional agents. 
The study served as a logical comparison to the other studies in this dissertation that rely 
on varying degrees of contextual information to convey metaphorical content. Results in 
this final study showed that participants tended to spend longer at the last word of the 
metaphorical sentence (compared to the matched literal item). This finding generally 
replicates many studies that show metaphor takes longer to read than literal sentences 
when not accompanied by contextual information (e.g., Inhoff, Lima & Carroll, 1984; 
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Ortony, Shallert & Reyonlds, 1978). Longer wrap up effects suggest the integration of 
pragmatic information (Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 2000). It is therefore possible that 
longer reaction times in the present study suggest participants were integrating inferential 
information (although this claim is highly speculative). 
 Results also showed that participants in the metaphor group scored significantly 
higher on the Eyes task compared to the literal group. Additionally, and as predicted, 
participants who read metaphorical sentences subsequently provided more social nouns in 
response to verb prompts. In contrast, the literal group used more biological words in 
response to these same nouns. The findings did not differ based on old or new nouns. In 
addition to the content of the responses in the noun generation task, semantic distance 
was analyzed using LSA. Past research suggests larger distances are indicative of 
“creative” processes (e.g., Prabhakaren, Green & Gray, 2011). Results of the present 
study showed average semantic distance between the two groups were not significantly 
different, suggesting that reading metaphorical sentences did not prompt a deployment to 
remote associates. 
The results show that the mere act of reading metaphors, out of context, still led to 
an orientation towards social information. This finding was demonstrated implicitly by 
superior recognition of emotional states on the Eyes task, and by a reliable increase in the 
use of words with social import when cued by a verb. Importantly, the study shows that 
these social effects can occur without an elaborative text in which a speaker utters the 
metaphor or, indeed, on a non-social task (like the noun-generation task). The findings 
also show that it is likely the act of reading and interpreting metaphor that drives the Eyes 
effects (and not merely context, as suggested by an alternate interpretation to the results 
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of Studies 1 and 2). These findings can be interpreted in light of an “as if” simulation 
process wherein participants seek relevant social and emotional information when 
reading metaphorical sentences (e.g., Ritchie, 2006; Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Congruent 
with findings in embodied cognition, this “as if” simulation transferred to other tasks.  
The metaphor group performed better, over all, on the Eyes task, demonstrating 
that they were more accurate at identifying emotions in sets of Eyes. This finding is 
congruent with Study 2 of this dissertation that shows the metaphor production task also 
prompted higher scores on the Eyes task. Why might metaphor prompt this particular 
effect? Reading metaphor likely results in a simulation of social information, which 
includes inferences about intention and emotional intensity (e.g., Ritchie, 2006). The 
results of Study 5 suggest an agent and intention is likely inferred in metaphor 
comprehension. That is, at some level, readers activated knowledge associated with an 
intentional agent when comprehending metaphor- especially when additional context is 
lacking. The findings of Study 5 are largely supportive of Katz’s (2005) claims that, even 
out of context, metaphor comprehension relies on contextual information. The inferential 
information associated with metaphor may be best considered social and interpersonal in 
nature. That is, because of the lack of context, participants were forced to process 
metaphorical sentences using an “as if” simulation of the kind proposed by Gibbs and 
Colston (2012). The result of this simulation was a stronger orientation to the social 
information conveyed by metaphor and thus higher scores on the Eyes task. Likewise, 
this orientation is demonstrated in social words used in a non-social, noun generation 
task.  
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Participants in this study not only strongly embodied an implicit intention of 
metaphor but also used more social category words in the noun generation task. In 
contrast, the literal group used words from LIWC’s biological category. One could argue 
that both findings suggest an embodied simulation of “humans”, the difference instead is 
that embodiment occurs at different levels (e.g., socially versus with body parts). 
Although both findings might be generally congruent with an embodied cognition 
approach, greater use of words from the social category suggests the embodied nature of 
metaphor is strongly interpersonal. That is, reading metaphor prompted a broader 
deployment of attention to social categories (i.e., people). These results are a unique 
addition to the literature and show the social inferences associated with metaphor 
comprehension also transfer to ostensibly non-social tasks. 
In contrast to the social effects, participants in the metaphor group did not 
produce more “creative” responses to the noun generation task. Metaphor did not prompt 
a deployment of attention to remote associates. Although, some studies have shown 
creative effects associated with metaphor (see e.g., Gold, Faust & Ben-Artzi, 2001), 
creativity has been understudied in this area. The findings of this study show that the 
more obvious effects may come from social knowledge and related ToM ability. Indeed, 
use of metaphor in everyday conversation may not necessarily be motivated by creative 
effects, but instead by interpersonal closeness. Nonetheless, the relation between 
creativity, social knowledge and metaphor use, remains an empirical question for future 
work. 
This final study suggests that, even out of context, readers search for the 
intentional and emotional information associated with metaphor to reach a coherent 
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understanding. This interpretation results in social effects. To date, little research has 
assessed the effects of metaphor comprehension or the role of social knowledge. In fact 
much of the work has been speculative (e.g., Ritchie, 2006). Study 5 suggests that 
activation of introspective qualities is important to metaphor interpretation and we seek 
intention in comments that lack additional contextual information. These findings 
complement other studies in this dissertation that use varying degrees of contextual 
information. Moreover, the social effects of metaphor may be a more interesting avenue 
to pursue than creative effects. The significance of these results and proposed 
mechanisms are further discussed in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5 General Discussion 
The operational goal of this dissertation was to address the gap in the literature 
that has overlooked the social effects of metaphor production and comprehension. This 
dissertation investigates the result of attending to, and elaborating on, a metaphorical 
message. Gibbs (1994) suggests that the social function of metaphor is twofold: metaphor 
allows the speaker to express his or her attitude (or, presumably, intention) and allows the 
target of the statement to understand this attitude (or intention). Therefore, the studies in 
this dissertation explore the expression of intention in context production studies and 
resulting social effects such as perceived interpersonal closeness or emotional intensity. 
The working hypothesis for the studies presented in this dissertation is that introspective 
qualities like emotion and intention are simulated in both the person who produces the 
metaphorical expression and the person who comprehends the meaning of this 
expression. The simulation was investigated in this dissertation by analyzing the context 
in which metaphor is used and by examining the effect of reading metaphor on other, 
ostensibly unrelated, tasks. This chapter begins with a review of the studies comprising 
this dissertation followed by a discussion of the implications and future directions.   
Review of studies 
In Studies 1 and 2, participants wrote a discourse context to make metaphorical or 
literal sentences meaningful. Previous research suggests metaphor is used to express a 
vivid emotional sentiment and to express abstract thought to others (Ortony, 1975). As a 
test of Ortony’s (1975) hypotheses, Study 1 and 2 were run with normed stimuli to 
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investigate the nature of the content that participants include in metaphorical and literal 
contexts. A computerized text analysis program (LIWC) was used to analyze this content.  
The first two studies demonstrated that participants providing context for 
metaphorical prompts used more idiomatic emotional expressions, cognitive mechanism 
words (e.g., “think” and “intend”), adverbs and first person pronouns. Those responding 
to the literal prompts used simple, physical descriptions. The use of adverbs and 
idiomatic language can be interpreted in light of past research that shows that these 
markers of speech are used to express emotional intensity and to insert personality in 
writing (e.g, Hopper, Knapp & Scott, 1981).  Additionally, past research suggests that use 
of cognitive mechanism words reflects a desire to express what one is thinking (e.g, 
Pennebaker, 2012). The use of the “I” pronoun in the metaphor context allowed the 
writers to insert themselves into what they were writing (e.g, Kuo, 1999). In contrast, use 
of “motion” words by the literal group suggests these contexts included physical 
descriptions of what was occurring instead of emotional and cognitive elements 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007). The findings of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants 
included different types of content when creating either metaphorical or literal contexts. 
Specifically, the findings support the idea that metaphorical contexts include markers of 
intention and emotion whereas literal contexts are simply physically descriptive. 
To supplement Study 1, Study 2 tested the writer’s social motivation to include 
certain types of content in metaphorical contexts and how this might differ from literal 
contexts. To do so, I examined correlations between the use of affect words by 
participants in the metaphor condition and their scores on the Eyes task. This analysis 
was motivated by the idea that the written content participants include in metaphor 
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contexts was socially expressive and used to inspire reactions in others. Socially 
expressive content was hypothesized to activate social processes. This prediction was 
assessed in Study 2 with the inclusion of the Eyes task. Confirming predictions, Study 2 
showed that participants’ use of affective words in the metaphor context production 
condition was positively correlated with their scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Participants who included a greater amount of emotional 
content in the metaphor condition were more accurate at identifying emotions in eyes. In 
contrast, this correlation was not found with the literal group. Study 2 also showed that 
the metaphor group scored higher, overall, on the Eyes task than the literal group. Taken 
together, the findings suggest that writers simulated an ostensive reader (mechanisms 
discussed in the next section). More broadly, the results of the first two studies support 
the contention that contexts produced in the metaphor condition convey a vivid, 
emotional message which is social in nature.  
Studies 3 and 4 assessed what readers infer when reading metaphor. These studies 
employed reading tasks wherein the information conveyed by contextual content was 
more constrained than the first two studies in order to exert tighter experimental control. 
Following methodology typically used in non-literal language research, participants in 
Studies 3 and 4 read short scenarios that ended with metaphorical or literal statements 
and answered questions assessing social and emotional inferences (on likert type scales). 
They also completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task to assess if social inferences 
required in metaphor interpretation are related to general social abilities (like ToM). As 
predicted, use of metaphor by characters in a story was perceived as suggesting greater 
emotional intensity and interpersonal closeness. Scores on the Eyes task positively and 
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uniquely correlated with relevant social variables (closeness and emotional intensity) in 
the metaphor condition. This correlation shows that those who perceived greater 
emotional intensity and closeness when metaphor is used, are generally more accurate at 
identifying the emotional experience of others. Once again, the results are supportive of 
the idea that metaphor conveys interpersonal information to readers; especially those who 
score high on a measure of social intelligence. These perception findings complement the 
context production findings of the first two studies. 
Study 5 tested the idea that, even out of context, metaphor comprehension 
proceeds through the reader’s inferences of relevant contextual and interpersonal 
information (e.g., Katz, 2005; Ritchie, 2006). In this final study, metaphor was presented 
without contextual and extralinguistic information and was read word-by-word on a 
computer screen. The motivation to present metaphor without context was to further 
assess the strength and versatility of the social effects found in the other studies of this 
dissertation. After reading metaphorical or literal sentences, the participants also 
completed a social task (the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task) and a non-social, 
creativity task (noun-generation task, where participants provided nouns in response to 
verb prompts). These tasks assessed, in different ways, when social inferences from 
reading metaphor spill over to other tasks. Indeed, results show that participants in the 
metaphor group did better on the Eyes task than the literal group, supporting the claim 
that, even out of context, metaphor conveys an interpersonal intention. This information 
is thought to be implicit in the metaphors used in this study. Additionally, compared to 
the literal group, participants in the metaphor group provided more “social” words in 
response to verb prompts. Participants, however, were not more creative with their 
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responses in the noun generation task, suggesting the relevant effects might be primarily 
social. 
Taken together, the results of the studies in this dissertation show metaphor has 
social effects.  Metaphor prompts an orientation to others’ emotional experience and 
requires a consciousness of the intention of the message. These experiences of metaphor 
result in social effects such as interpersonal closeness and emotional intensity. The five 
studies represent one of the first attempts to explore metaphor’s social effects 
experimentally. Generally speaking, the results support the premise that metaphor is used 
because it expresses an interpersonal perspective more strongly than literal language and 
may serve to build relationships. The representation of intention and the emotional 
inferences are true for both the writer (or creator) of the metaphor (as in Studies 1 and 2) 
and the reader of metaphor (in Studies 3, 4 and 5). The studies in this dissertation thus 
provide a general explanation for why we might use metaphorical rather than literal 
language at certain points in conversation and with certain people. 
Review of Theory 
 The current state of the metaphor research is a mix of comprehension theories, 
each of which can, at best, only explain some of the requisite psychological processes 
involved in interpretation. For instance, early models identify some of the relevant 
features (or constraints) involved in inferences associated with metaphor comprehension 
(e.g., familiarity or aesthetic judgment; Katz et al., 1988).  Context and pragmatic models 
broaden the research scope and incorporate extralinguistic knowledge such as the role of 
gender and friendship status into the inferences required in metaphor comprehension 
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(Katz, 2005). Similarly, research shows that metaphor comprehension relies, in part, on 
common ground or the shared knowledge on which the interaction rests (Clark, 1996). 
However, a recent review of non-literal language research (Gibbs & Colston, 2012) 
suggests that the current models are unable to fully demonstrate what people infer from 
figurative language or the role of pragmatic effects. At best, each model can only explain 
one aspect of comprehension and no single model can provide a complete account of how 
metaphorical meaning is reached. 
 The research presented in this dissertation emphasizes the powerful social effects 
of metaphor and may serve to extend much of the current theorizing about figurative 
language. The motivation to use metaphor comes from a desire to engage others 
emotionally and cognitively. Early work by Ortony (1975) suggests that metaphor has 
unique interpersonal effects like expressing abstract thought or making topics more vivid. 
Recent theorizing connects Ortony’s (1975) hypotheses to the ability to take others’ 
perspective (e.g., Gibbs, Leggitt & Turner, 2002). That is, metaphor is used to effectively 
communicate with or inspire emotional reactions in other individuals.  The research in 
this dissertation suggests that inferences associated with metaphor can result in powerful 
social effects (like interpersonal closeness). Metaphor’s effects might be best explained 
with an embodied cognition approach. 
 Proponents of embodied cognition indicate that language conveys more than 
static, specific meanings and that interlocutors’ experience of language is perceptually 
and emotionally embodied (Barsalou, 2008). According to embodied cognition, the brain 
coordinates multimodal information (e.g., emotion) not captured by amodal accounts in 
order to compute meaning out of raw data and to ground experience in embodied 
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simulation (Barsalou, 2008). Comprehension via simulation involves the reliving or 
reimagining of the pertinent information associated with the stimulus. Researchers 
propose that the embodied information associated with metaphor comprehension includes 
introspective qualities such as emotion and the intention of the comment (see e.g., 
Ritchie, 2006). Related to these qualities is the idea that metaphor interpretation prompts 
an “as if” simulation of others’ thoughts and feelings (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). This “as 
if” simulation involves taking another’s perspective in communication. Although not 
explicitly stated in their work, this “as if” simulation likely requires social abilities like 
ToM. Therefore, we activate emotional and social knowledge as a part of the embodied 
comprehension of metaphor in order to understand what is being communicated.  
Based on embodied cognition, a likely process of understanding metaphor is 
simulation whereby we infer other’s intentions and emotions (e.g., “as if” simulation of 
Gibbs and Colston, 2012). Throughout this dissertation, I connect this process with 
introspective simulation proposed by Barsalou (1998, connected to metaphor by Ritchie, 
2006). In inferring intention we activate introspective simulators. A basic example of 
how introspective simulation might operate can be illustrated with abstract words. In 
comprehending the word “love”, we simulate basic emotions as well as contextual 
information and intention associated with an agent (see, e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005). The ability to introspect in this manner also covers higher cognitive 
abilities like truth, negation, intention and pretense. Moreover, Barsalou (1998) seems to 
suggest that without the ability to introspect, we would not be able to use ToM processes. 
Barsalou (1998) prefers a non-modular, domain general approach, whereby attention 
directs the nature of introspection (e.g., to emotional content) and these qualities are 
119 
 
 
 
stored as perceptual symbols (i.e., “associative patterns of neurons” that represent the 
cognitive activity p. 583) for future cognitive work. The relevant cognition work in 
comprehending metaphor (and therefore the activation of perceptual symbols) varies with 
context and effort. In sum, I believe introspective qualities are fundamental to processing 
metaphor. Whether this type of mechanism is fully congruent with ToM or whether 
alternate accounts are needed, remains to be seen.   
There are a number of ways that the studies in this dissertation are consistent with 
an embodied perspective of metaphorical language. In Studies 1 and 2, participants used 
vivid, emotional language to create meaningful metaphorical contexts. The vivid 
experience of metaphor is tied, in part, to embodying (or re-living) cognitive and 
emotional experiences associated with the stimuli. Additionally, Study 2 showed that 
writers in the metaphor group were more accurate at recognizing others’ emotions after 
creating metaphorical contexts. This finding can be interpreted in light of the general 
embodied cognition methodology that suggests whatever relevant information is strongly 
simulated in one task (e.g., the content of metaphorical contexts) can influence another, 
ostensibly unrelated task. Therefore, in Study 2, writers were simulating another’s 
perspective when they included emotional content.  Studies 3 and 4 provide indirect 
support of embodied cognition and metaphor. Past research shows that readers simulate 
emotions and intentions of characters in text (Zwann, 1999). The findings of Studies 3 
and 4 showed that readers infer emotional intensity and closeness when characters used 
metaphorical comments. Additionally, those who were more accurate at identifying 
emotions in others (as measure by the Eyes task) perceived greater emotional intensity 
and closeness between speakers using metaphor. Participants demonstrated this pattern of 
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results because they were able to embody others’ perspectives and this skill is related to 
metaphor comprehension. These correlational findings thus suggest metaphor 
interpretation involves general social ability. Finally, Study 5 shows, even out of context, 
participants embodied intention when they read metaphorical comments. This 
embodiment was shown implicitly by higher scores on the Eyes task and use of social 
nouns in a noun generation task after participants had read metaphorical statements. Once 
again, what is embodied in one task, transfers to another. In sum, the results of the five 
studies suggest an embodied experience of metaphor. 
Related to embodied cognition, the results of this dissertation are broadly 
suggestive of an “as if” (Gibbs & Colston, 2012) simulation. This “as if” simulation is an 
embodied interpretation of what a speaker expresses and, one could speculate, likely 
operates via ToM processes. Ritchie (2006) posits that metaphor comprehension 
incorporates introspective qualities like emotion and inferences about intention. These 
factors are, arguably, the core elements of an “as if” simulation. The result of such 
simulations are the “social effects” of metaphor detailed in this dissertation. As Gibbs and 
Colston (2012) suggest, metaphorical language is a social invitation to infer the thoughts 
and feelings of the speaker. The target of the metaphor “projects” themselves into the 
mind of someone else, to infer thought and experience strong emotional closeness. 
Furthermore, as the results of Study 5 show, the “as if” simulation may occur even out of 
an explicit conversational context. 
 The findings speak to a recent theory proposed by Ritchie (2006). Context limited 
simulation theory incorporates the roles of context, embodied simulation, common 
ground and relevance in the comprehension of metaphor (e.g., Ritchie, 2006).  The 
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proposed theory is largely untested and hypothetical. Applying embodied cognition, 
Context limited simulation provides a theoretical basis for the importance of context and 
extralinguistic knowledge in understanding what is said. Ritchie (2006) claims that 
metaphor has its origins in social interactions and non-literal interpretation relies on an 
explicit or implicit context. Relevant features are activated through an embodied 
experience of the topics of communication. Importantly, interpretation relies heavily on 
the conversational context, introspective qualities like emotion and, I argue, interpersonal 
intention. As this dissertation suggests, it is possible that, at some level, the introspective 
qualities he proposes include intention of the speaker. In fact, Ritchie (2006) suggests 
that even without an explicit speaker, contextual information is still inferred. Although 
his theory has not been widely tested, the results presented in this dissertation should be 
considered in light of this framework. The results of the work in this dissertation show 
interpersonal expression is likely simulated when both understanding and using 
metaphor. The findings in this study extend Ritchie’s (2006) theory by suggesting the 
result of introspective simulation is powerful social and emotional effects. 
 Another perspective should also be considered in addition to the “as if” simulation 
and context limited simulation. Recall, that use of metaphor is essentially an act of 
pretense: saying one thing but intending something else. Mar and others (2006; Oately, 
1999; Oately 2011) characterize acts of pretense as informative ways to simulate social 
knowledge about other people, including emotional experience and intentions of 
characters in fiction. Pretense allows us to simulate a wider range of experience than 
literal perspectives. The results of the studies in this dissertation suggest metaphor may 
act as a point in conversation or reading to reflect on the motivation of the characters or 
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to discuss one’s own intention. Extended processing of metaphor, as in fictitious 
narratives, may prompt a mode of thought that is different from more literal modes (e.g., 
a narrative mode; see: Bruner, 1986; Gerrig 1993). This mode allows the writer or reader 
to strongly simulate interpersonal knowledge or consider others’ perspective more 
broadly (e.g, Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Therefore, in addition to an “as if” simulation and 
the role of contextual information, a metaphorical mode of thought induced in the 
participants may help explain the group differences found in this dissertation. That is, it is 
possible that reading and writing about metaphor prompted a unique mode of thought that 
spilled over to other tasks like the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. Therefore, 
participants were not only embodying another’s perspective, but doing so quite 
differently than a literal group. 
 A question arising from the data presented here is whether or not there are 
individual differences in embodied simulation related to metaphor comprehension (for 
discussion on individual differences and metaphor comprehension see Blasko, 1999). 
Barsalou (2008) suggests that people can show individual variability in simulation when, 
for instance, those people are experts in a certain field. As an example, compared to non-
experts, expert ballerinas more strongly simulate movements produced by other 
ballerinas (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Extending these expertise findings to the present 
study, it is possible that individual differences in ToM ability can result in different 
patterns of use of metaphor and different levels of processing and comprehension. One 
could predict that English majors might be experts in non-literal language and pretense 
because their field of expertise requires them to notice this type of language. These 
groups may show higher Eyes scores and greater patterns of metaphor use. Additionally, 
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they may be more prone to perceive metaphor as relevant and, consequently, process it 
deeply. In the present research, the correlational findings between closeness ratings and 
the Eyes scores (e.g, Study 3), suggest there are individual differences in embodied 
experience of communication in normal populations. 
 The research presented in this dissertation more broadly speaks to the “special” 
nature of metaphorical language. Early theories (e.g., Ortony, 1975) of metaphor 
suggested comprehension and use involved extra or “special” cognitive work. 
Additionally, proponents of these theories suggest that metaphor is special in that it 
allows the speaker to express what is not easily expressed with literal language (Ortony, 
1975; Gibbs & Colston, 2012). In contrast, other researchers suggested that metaphor is 
not a remarkable aspect of language and it does not require work that is much different 
from literal language (Giora, 2008). However, the social nature of this cognitive work 
has, up until, not been investigated. The studies presented in this dissertation suggest this 
extra cognitive work may be, in part, interpersonal in nature. Ortony’s (1975) vividness 
and expressibility effects are best understood in light of a reader or writer’s desire to 
express an intention. Metaphor is “special” because it can engage introspective and 
interpersonal simulation more strongly than literal language.  
The results of this dissertation prompt larger questions related to embodied 
cognition and social effects. There are, of course, many actions that are considered 
“social”. Rorty (1989, p 220) suggests “tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like 
suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a face, or pulling a 
photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature in your 
surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor’s face or kissing him”. His position implies 
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social effects such as the ones described in this dissertation can result from any 
anomalous or attention grabbing action. My research, of course, does not test the relation 
of these actions to social tests like the Eyes task. Although showing a photograph or 
kissing or slapping someone may indeed prompt an “as if” simulation, we are not always 
able to express ourselves in this way. My position is that metaphor is readily accessible 
and can be widely used to produce a social response from an interlocutor. Metaphor 
additionally allows the speaker to produce subtle, socially acceptable effects and may be 
just one of the tools we use to inspire closeness and emotional response in others. 
Another question arising from the data presented in this dissertation is, can other 
types of language prompt an “as if” simulation and result in similar social effects? 
Although I argue that metaphor is a unique method of communication, I do not argue that 
other types of language do not require ToM or cannot result in social effects. As Gibbs 
(2006) indicates, embodied cognition may be more strongly required when the reader or 
interpreter is trying to make sense of events or why something was said. Therefore, one 
could imagine a literal context where one might want to infer some motivation or 
intention. For instance, imagine you are standing in line at a coffee shop and a stranger 
says “nice day today”. Depending on the gender of the person you may wonder if he or 
she is simply being friendly or interested in having a coffee with you. The point of the 
studies presented in this dissertation is to show that metaphor is a unique form of 
interpersonal expression that draws attention to itself because it is non-literal pretense. It 
is equally possible that literal language, at times, can result in social effects. 
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Limitations and future research 
 Even though the research in this dissertation provides a cohesive picture of 
metaphor’s social effects, there are a few limitations to consider. Gibbs and Colston 
(2012, p.5) suggest “researchers tacitly assume that any figurative statement can be 
paraphrased [literally]”. Indeed, this assumption is widely held in order to experimentally 
investigate many different types of non-literal language. These authors suggest the 
categorical literal/non-literal distinction is a crude method of investigation that is too 
simplistic to truly capture the nature of metaphor comprehension. The research presented 
in this dissertation does indeed use a binary literal/non-literal distinction for experimental 
purposes. Given experimental constraints, it would be very difficult not to use a binary 
distinction. However, in truth, a graded view between literal and non-literal language 
may be equally appropriate. Future research can test the social effects of metaphor using 
this graded approach. One way to do so would be to correlate social ratings (emotionality 
and closeness) with metaphoricity ratings (i.e., the degree to which the statement is 
metaphorically true, see e.g., Katz et al., 1988). 
 Another possible avenue for research is to examine the effects in more interactive, 
face to face communication. In their review, Gibbs and Colston (2012) suggest that 
presenting tropes in isolation is a constraining and even unnatural approach. Instead, they 
suggest researchers should consider the effects of non-literal language across different 
contexts. Additionally, they suggest researchers might want to consider complex, 
interactive communication with numerous instances of figurative language (as in 
extended text or discourse). Again, for the sake of experimental control, the research 
presented in this dissertation constrains the type and amount of figurative language that is 
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presented to participants. However, a logical next step would be to determine if these 
social effects emerge in an interactive framework by perhaps using computer mediated 
communication or a face to face discourse methodology. For instance, use of metaphor in 
interactive communication may result in higher scores on a measure of social sensitivity 
like the Eyes task. Additionally, pairing conversation partners who have high Eyes scores 
and having them discuss certain topics may result in greater use of metaphor and other 
types of non-literal language. More broadly, the work presented in this dissertation can 
even be extended to explore how the social effects of metaphor can create and maintain 
social in-groups and out-groups. 
These social effects can also be examined using different types of figurative 
language (e.g., sarcasm and irony). Sarcasm and irony require that participants recognize 
that the interlocutor is intending the opposite of what he or she is saying (see, e.g, Bowes 
& Katz, 2012). Because of the contradictory nature of sarcastic comments, Gibbs and 
Colston (2012) propose that sarcasm may activate ToM more strongly than metaphor. 
Therefore, studies similar to the ones in this dissertation could be run using sarcasm as 
the target non-literal language type. One could predict that participants would score 
higher on measures of social sensitivity (like the Eyes task) after reading sarcastic 
comments (compared to non-sarcastic equivalents).   
  In the background of much of the work presented in this dissertation is the 
embodied experience of both reading metaphor and interpreting it in light of an ostensive 
reader/writer. Embodied experience is thought to be the best explanation for some of the 
effects shown in this dissertation. Future work can test embodied cognition and metaphor 
interpretation in a number of ways. For instance, much of work on embodied cognition 
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involves the participant imagining themselves physically, in a certain context. For 
instance, one study (Zhong & Leonardilli, 2008) had participants imagine a time when 
they felt either socially excluded or included. These participants then rated the 
temperature of the room; an ostensibly unrelated task. Researchers found that those 
recalling a time of social exclusion rated the temperature of the room as significantly 
colder. The findings suggest that social isolation is bodily connected to coldness. Future 
research can assess the embodied social effects of metaphor using tasks similar to that of 
Zhong and Leonardelli (2008). For instance, interpersonal closeness in metaphor may 
suggest that two speakers are standing closer to one another or perhaps that the room 
feels warmer. Another way to test an embodied approach is to investigate how metaphor 
influences one’s own emotional experience. For instance, use of metaphor may make 
other speakers seem happier. Indeed, the studies presented in this dissertation provide a 
wealth of possible research avenues.  
 Neuroscientific studies could also be brought to bear on the role of social effects 
of metaphor. The studies in this dissertation show ToM activation in metaphor 
comprehension. Neuroscientific evidence shows a diffuse network is involved in taking 
others’ perspectives and empathetic response. This network includes the medial 
prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus (Vollm et al., 2006). Likewise, research 
suggests emotional regions like the amygdala are involved in empathy, ToM and 
performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 
1994). Imaging research will further identify the relative activation of these networks in 
metaphor processing and the circumstances under which this activation occurs. For 
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instance, imaging studies could be run to test the idea that metaphor activates an “as if” 
network in the brain that involves recognition of intention and emotion. 
 A final possible avenue for research is testing metaphor’s social effects across 
different populations (children or individuals with Asperger syndrome). Children, for 
instance, must develop the ability to accurately identify thoughts and feelings in others 
(e.g., Vosniadu, 1987). It is therefore possible to examine children’s perception or 
production of metaphor at different developmental stages, when ToM ability is 
concurrently developing. One could predict that children without ToM ability do not use 
metaphor and have trouble interpreting intention. This research would further support 
social effects in metaphor comprehension and production. Social interpretations of 
metaphor might even inform the extent of abilities in those with Asperger syndrome or 
even those with Alzheimer’s disease where perception of this type of language is 
compromised to some degree (Amanzio, Geminiani, Leotta & Cappa, 2008).   
Conclusions 
 The production and perception of metaphor requires activation of social 
knowledge. This activation results in social effects. Participants produced social content 
like emotional intensity or expression of abstract thought when prompted by 
metaphorical stimuli (Studies 1 and 2). Metaphor in text suggested the interlocutors were 
interpersonally close and that an utterance was more emotionally intense than a literal 
equivalent (Studies 3 and 4). Finally, comprehension of metaphor out-of-context, still 
exerted some effect, such that participants reading metaphor tended to do better on a 
ToM task (Study 5). The research presented in this dissertation suggests intention and 
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social factors should be included in current theorizing to explain why one might use 
metaphorical as opposed to literal language.  
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Appendix B  
Example of stimuli used in Studies 1 and 2 
Metaphor 
The minister stirred the audience.    
The reader raced through the novel.    
The news story was babble.    
The haircut was a good chuckle.    
The woman dove into her knitting.    
The first date was a stumble.   
His poetry was a cathartic moan.    
Her uncle is an irrepressible belch.    
The case worker trudged through the files.    
The clever detective jumped at the clue.    
The celebrity leapt at the book deal.    
His lawyer pressed for a new trial.    
Her rejection letter was a slap.    
The accountant snuck through the loophole.    
The reception was a snore.    
The lies snaked through the story.  
 
Literal 
The cook stirred the stew.    
The man raced past the empty lot.    
The baby talk was babble.    
Her aside was a rude chuckle.    
The woman dove into the pool    
The skater's mistake was a stumble.    
His only communication was a moan.    
His blunder was a loud belch.    
The park guide trudged through the swamp.    
The performer jumped on the platform.    
The happy fan leapt during the goal.    
The heavy box pressed against his side.    
The punishment was a strong slap.    
The teenager snuck out the beer.    
The funny thing was his snore.    
The python snaked around the victim.  
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Appendix C 
 
1) Irritated 
2) Disappointed 
3) Depressed 
4) Accusing 
 
1) Arrogant 
2) Grateful 
3) Sarcastic 
4)Tentative 
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Appendix D 
Emotional Self Disclosure Scales 
Listed below are 10 emotions that we experience in our lives. In this survey we want you to 
indicate on a scale from 1-5, how willing you are to talk about these experiences with your same 
sex friends. 1 means not at all willing to talk about this, 2 means slightly willing, 3 mean 
moderately willing 4 means almost totally willing 5 means totally willing to talk.  
Times when you felt happy 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt angry 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt cheerful 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt infuriated 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt joyous 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt irritated 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt delighted 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt hostile 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt pleased 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
Times when you felt enraged 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all        moderately    Totally willing 
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Appendix E 
Ethics approval for Study 2 
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Appendix F 
Ethics for studies 3 and 4 
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Appendix G 
Example of Stimuli for Studies 3 and 4 
Frank knew that Edward wasn’t reliable. Frank had told him some personal information 
and Edward told the rest of their friends about it. Edward suggested that Frank was prone 
to problems. Frank warned Kyle: “be careful what you say to him”.  (Metaphorical: 
“watch your back around him”) 
Maria had just completed a nursing course and graduated with honors. She thought that 
she would be able to get a good job. She was ready to celebrate her hard work. Julia saw 
Maria later that day and suggested they go out for dinner. Maria responded , “what a very 
good idea”. (Metaphorical: “what a gem of an idea”). 
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Appendix H 
Ethical Approval for Study 5 
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Appendix I 
Example of stimuli used in Study 5 
Metaphor 
Her  stare  was  a  bull  charge.   
His  illness  was  a  slow  drift.   
His  job  was  an  endless  groan.   
His  novel  was  a  perspective  flip.   
His  work  experience  was  a  clumsy  clamber.   
His  yacht  was  a  rich  swagger.   
His  youth  was  a  happy  canter.   
The  anthology  was  a  literary  wander.   
The  art  major  was  a  glide.   
The  assignment  was  an  easy  sail.   
The  card  was  a  sympathetic  hug.   
The  cash  was  a  steady  flow.   
The  ceremony  was  a  swamp  trudge.   
The  coast  was  a  beckoning  voice.   
The  contract  was  a  legal  zigzag.   
The  court  case  was  a  stroll.   
The  criticisms  were  a  stampede.   
The  date  was  a  successful  launch.   
The  day's  events  were  a  whir.   
The  declined  invitation  was  a  stab.   
The  divorce  was  a  hard  fall.   
The  dress  was  a  revealing  sizzle.   
The  editorial  was  a  brass-knuckle  punch.   
The  editorial  was  a  middle  class  whine.   
The  email  was  a  desperate  cry.   
The  eviction  was  a  mean  sweep.   
The  film  was  a  laugh.   
The  home  purchase  was  a  skydive.   
The  interview  was  a  painful  crawl.   
The  last  month  was  a  sprint.   
The  letter  was  a  goodbye  wave.   
The  letter  was  a  lonely  sigh.   
The  letter  was  a  polite  grumble.   
The  lie  was  an  integrity  collapse.   
The  man's  tattoo  was  a  rebel  yell.   
The  marriage  was  a  forced  march.   
The  new  roommate  was  a  dice  roll.   
The  newspaper  stories  were  a  trickle.   
The  numbers  were  a  brain  swarm.   
The  pamphlet  was  a  rant.   
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The  partnership  was  a  financial  tailspin.   
Her  career  was  a  rough  climb.   
Her  inquiries  were  a  nervous  scamper.   
Her  orders  were  a  sharp  bark. 
The  petition  was   a  mad  dash.   
The  price  change  was  a  major  drop.   
The  prize  money  was  a  lift.   
The  puzzle  was  a  logic  cartwheel.   
The  reception  was  a  real  snore.   
The  reception  was  an  icy  swim.   
The  review  was  a  karate  chop.   
The  road  was  an  irresistible  pull.   
The  secretary's  promotion  was  a  leap.   
The  taxes  were  a  steady  creep.   
The  test  review  was  a  quick  jog.   
The  exhibition  was  a  smash.   
The  therapy  was  an  archeological  dig.   
The  writer's  job  is  a  lonely  drive. 
   
Literal 
Her  exit  was  a  nervous  scamper.   
Her  only  comment  was  a  sigh.   
Her  reply  was  a  mean  laugh.   
His  gait  was  a  confident  swagger.   
His  gesture  was  a  quick  chop.   
His  lawyers  interjection  was  an  angry  yell.   
His  trick  was  a  back  flip.   
The  approach  was  a  stampede.   
The  bacon's  cooking  was  a  sizzle.   
The  battle  plan  was  a  charge.   
The  bay  was  a  difficult  sail.   
The  bed  was  a  heavy  lift.   
The  bees  were  a  black  swarm.   
The  blow  was  a  single  punch.   
The  bowler's  throw  was  a  straight  roll.   
The  bungee  jump  was  a  scary  drop.   
The  chase  was  a  fast  dash.   
The  child's  request  was  a  whine.   
The  chore  was  a  quick  sweep.   
The  competitive  relay  was  a  swim.   
The  creek  was  a  small  leap.   
The  current  was  a  fast  drift.   
The  disturbance  was  a  smash.   
The  engine  was  a  low  whir.   
The  excursion  was  an  afternoon  wander.   
The  expedition  was  a  desert  dig.   
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The  faucet  leak  was  a  trickle.   
The  final  ascent  was  an  exhausting  clamber.   
The  final  competition  was  a  sprint.   
The  flood  was  a  rapid  flow.   
The  friend's  greeting  was  a  hug.   
The  funny  thing  was  his  snore.   
The  grandfather's  accident  was  a  fall.   
The  gymnastics  stunt  was  a  cartwheel.   
The  hallucination  was  a  ghostly  voice.   
The  hike  was  a  leisurely  stroll.   
The  horse's  trot  was  a  canter.   
The  injury  was  a  knife  stab.   
The  magnet  was  a  weak  pull.   
The  man's  retort  was  a  grumble.   
The  motion  was  a  swimmer's  crawl.   
The  mountain  road  was  a  zigzag.   
The  mountain  was  an  easy  climb.   
The  news  was  a  rocket  launch.   
The  panther's  approach  was  a  creep.   
The  parade  was  a  military  march.   
The  patient's  reply  was  a  groan.   
The  plane's  trajectory  was  a  tailspin.   
The  prize  was  a  free  skydive.   
The  race  course  was  an  easy  jog.   
The  skater’s  entrance  was  a  glide.   
The  sound  was  a  dog's  bark.   
The  speech  was  a  rant.   
The  surprise  was  a  hawk's  cry.   
The  tragedy  was  a  building  collapse.   
The  tsunami  was  a  giant  wave.   
The  vacation  was  a  cross  country  drive.   
The  way  back  was  a  trudge.   
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